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Introduction 
Welcome to the 2006 edition of the NASA Range Safety Annual Report. This report, funded by NASA 
Headquarters, provides a NASA Range Safety overview for current and potential range users. This year we 
present summaries from the various NASA Range Safety Program activities that took place throughout the 
year, as well as information on several special projects that appear to have a profound impact on the way 
we will do business in the future. 
The sections include development of range safety policy (especially with regard to the Constellation 
Program), NASA Range Safety non-compliance procedures, risk assessment activities, an overview of 
NASA Range Safety Training, independent assessment updates, our involvement with the Common 
Standards Working Group, updates to existing range safety policy and guidance, new and interesting 
developments in the range safety systems realm, our involvement with uninhabited aerial vehicle 
requirements development, NASA Range Safety support to launch programs, and reports from our various 
Centers. 
As is the case each year, contributors to this report are too numerous to mention, but we thank individuals 
from the NASA Centers, the Department of Defense, and civilian organizations for their contributions. We've 
made a great effort to include the most current information available. We recommend the report be used 
only for guidance and the validity and accuracy of all articles be verified for any updates since this writing. 
This is the last year I will oversee the production of this report. As of December 2006, Mr. Alan Dumont 
assumed duties as the Agency Range Safety Manager. Alan's most recent role was Kennedy Space Center 
Range Safety Manager, and he possesses significant experience in the range safety arena. He's worked as 
a Mission Flight Control Officer at both the Eastem and Western Ranges and also was Chief of Flight 
Analysis at the Eastern Range before joining NASA in 2004. The future is bright with Alan on board! 
You'll note we've transitioned to a web-based format this year. We hope you'll find this very useful, as we've 
provided links to numerous references and graphical aids. We'd like to especially thank Mr. Tony Anderson 
from NASA-KSC for his expertise and professionalism in the creation of this web based product. Enjoy! 
Maria A. Collura, NASA 
Outgoing Range Safety Manager 
4 
Agency Range Safety Program 
Program Overview and 2006 Highlights 
2006 proved to be another eventful and exciting year in the Range Safety realm. Before 
we highlight the areas covered in this year's edition, it's important to restate the goal of 
the NASA Range Safety Program. The program is defined in NPR 8715.5, dated 8 July 
2005, and is signed by the NASA Administrator. The goal of the program is to protect the 
public, the workforce, and property during range operations such as launching, flying, 
landing, and testing launch vehicles. This goal applies to all centers and test facilities 
and all space vehicle programs including expendable launch vehicles, reusable launch 
vehicles, uninhabited aerial vehicles, and the Space Shuttle as well as any NASA-
funded commercial ventures that involve range operations. We meet the goal of the NPR 
by mitigating and controlling hazards, such as uncontrolled vehicles, debris, explosives, 
and toxics associated with range operations. 
In this issue, we cover several areas of range safety that point to how we meet or 
implement the range safety program. One of our primary focuses relates to range safety 
training and our continuing efforts regarding the NASA Range Safety Training Program. 
We brought one additional class on-line in 2006, and are poised to bring another course 
on-line in 2007. We've also been extremely busy in the development, implementation, 
and support of range safety policy. 
The year started out in full swing with the advent of the Constellation Program. Since last 
December, we've been working the challenges associated with bringing a new program 
to Kennedy Space Center. We also cover the strides we've made regarding the risk and 
variance processes that are now in place for'f1ights from the Eastern and Western 
Ranges. We're also busy working on agreements with the Eastern and Western Ranges 
regarding NASA Range Safety on-console launch support. In 2005, we secured 
agreements with the ranges regarding personnel on-console for NASA launch 
operations. In 2006, we worked to further codify these processes. 
NASA Range Safety personnel continue to support the Range Commander's Council 
meetings and have been involved in updating policy related to flight safety systems and 
flight safety analysis. A recap of these efforts is highlighted. We address our continued 
support to the Common Standards Working Group in updates to current range safety 
policy, as well as assisting in development of new policy for reusable launch vehicles. 
We are also working with the 45th Space Wing Safety Office to develop a policy 
document for unmanned aerial vehicles that we hope to use to promote safe flying at 
Kennedy Space Center and on the Eastern Range in the not-too-distant future. 
Another milestone achieved this year was gaining approval of the Space Shuttle Launch 
and Landing Implementation Plans. NASA Range Safety also stayed fully engaged on 
issues related to flight safety systems throughout the year. A detailed discussion of the 
challenges the range safety community is currently facing regarding flight safety systems 
in the areas of secure technology and frequency use is provided. 
In addition to working training and policy issues, NASA Range Safety was involved in 
one independent assessment of Orbital Sciences Corporation in 2006. We also present 
our efforts in establishing or identifying a common risk analysis tool for use at all NASA 
launch locations. This issue focuses on our efforts to properly account for personnel on 
center during launch operations via the Self-Service Management Tool that is in use at 
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Kennedy Space Center. We address launch operations at other NASA Centers, 
specifically with support provided to Wallops Flight Facility for the launch of TACSAT-2 
on a Minotaur launch vehicle, and we provide a re-cap of launches from all ranges for 
the year. 
One of the areas that holds the interest of many in the range safety community is 
emerging range safety technology. Articles that focus on space based range capabilities, 
autonomous flight safety systems, the enhanced flight termination system, the joint 
advanced range safety system and the subminiature flight safety system are included in 
this issue. In addition, we cover instrumentation upgrades that have been put in place at 
the Eastern Range over the year. 
This issue provides insight into some special interest items, specifically the details 
surrounding distant focusing overpressure modeling and how that relates to launch risk. 
Other articles address on the State of Florida's efforts to educate launch providers on 
range safety and recent strides in the expendable launch vehicle payload safety world. 
We wrap this issue up with range safety reports from the NASA Centers that were 
actively involved with range safety issues throughout the year. The graphic below gives 
a brief overview of the major topics contained in this report. Feel free to migrate directly 
to any topic by selecting items that are of interest. 
(Tony ... can we provide links from this graphic?) 
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NASA Range Safety Training 2006 
The NASA Range Safety Training program remained a primary focus of NASA Range 
Safety once again this year. This effort began in 2002 and covers all topics of range 
safety in detail. These programs address the training needs for range safety personnel 
and are applicable and available to NASA, the Department of Defense, the Federal 
Aviation Administration, and the Missile Defense Agency. Final development of all 
training is almost complete. The final phase of training, the Range Safety Operations 
course, is anticipated to come on-line in 2007. The graphic below illustrates the two-
phase development process we used for these courses. 
Development Plan 
.... SdetJ 
0rteIIa ..... 2.,.,. 
Advaaeed Huge 
Safety Traialng 
Phase I 
course developed 
mCY02 
Phase II courses include classroom instruction, hands-on training, and 
testing to evaluate student understanding 
The development strategy originally put in place has served well in reaching critical 
milestones to date. An original steering group comprised of NASA, the Air Force, and the 
Federal Aviation Administration provided the foundation for the basic outlines of the 
courses. 
Depending on the course content, the Range Safety Training Group had representatives 
from NASA Head Quarters, Kennedy Space Center, Dryden Flight Research Center, 
Wallops Flight Facility, 45th and 30th Space Wings, the Air Force Flight Test Center, the 
Federal Aviation Administration, the Missile Defense Agency, and members of the 
Range Commanders Council/Range Safety Group. 
These parties were charged with analyzing, designing, and developing the individual 
course content, leading to delivery at the NASA Safety Training Center. The training 
center provides implementation and evaluation of the training. This development 
strategy is shown below. 
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Development Strategy 
~ 
Range Safety Training Working Group i 
NASA HO, KSC, DFRC, WFF 0 
45 SW, 30 SW, AFFTC ~ 
" FAA, RCC/RSG 8 
NSTC 
To date, we've conducted fifteen Range Safety Orientation courses with 415 students in 
attendance, three Flight Safety Analysis courses with 45 students in attendance, and 
one Flight Safety Systems course with 15 students. The Range Safety Operations 
course is progressing well, and we anticipate the first course will take place at Wallops 
Flight Facility in July of 2007. The graphic below shows the schedule for all courses for 
2007. 
2007 Classes 
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Range Safety Orientation 
The Range Safety Orientation course is designed to give NASA senior, program, and 
project managers an understanding of the Range Safety mission, associated policies 
and requirements, and NASA roles and responsibilities. It introduces the major ranges 
and their capabilities, defines and discusses the major elements of Range Safety (flight 
analysis, flight termination systems, range operations), and briefly addresses associated 
range safety topics such as ground safety, frequency management, and uninhabited 
aerial vehicles. 
The course emphasizes the principles of safety risk management to ensure the public 
and NASA workforces are not subjected to risk of injury greater than their normal day-to-
day activities. It is designed to inform the audience of the services offered by the Range 
Safety organization and to recommend ways of making the working relationship with 
Range Safety most beneficial for the Range User. It also presents timeframes that allow 
adequate interface with Range Safety during program/project startup and design to 
minimize potential delays and costs. This course includes a visit to range safety facilities 
at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station and Kennedy Space Center and will normally only 
be given at this location. If you wish to discuss presenting the class at your location, 
please contact the NASA Safety Training Center staff. 
Target Audience: Senior, program, and project managers; Safety, Reliability, Quality, 
and Maintainability professionals with an interest in range safety activities 
The Range Safety Orientation course includes the following topics: 
• Range Safety Mission and 
Organization 
• Policies, Standards, and Directives 
• Launch and Test Facilities 
• Flight Analysis 
• Flight Termination Systems 
• Tracking and Telemetry Systems 
• Range Safety Operations 
• Ground Safety 
• Frequency Management 
• Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles 
• The Way Ahead 
• Hands-On Orientation 
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Range Flight Safety Analysis 
The Range Flight Safety Analysis course provides a detailed understanding of range 
safety analysis. It includes NASA, Federal Aviation Administration, and Department of 
Defense requirements for flight safety analysis; a discussion of range operations 
hazards, risk criteria and risk management processes; and an in-depth coverage of the 
containment and risk management analyses performed for expendable launch vehicles 
at the Eastern Range. 
Although the course is based on expendable launch vehicles at the Eastern Range, the 
overall analysis process and concepts are applicable to other vehicles and other ranges 
as well. The course concentrates on debris hazards and analyses but includes an 
overview of toxic, blast, and radiation analyses. The course includes a class exercise 
that covers the entire analysis process. 
Prerequisite: Completion of NSTC 074, Range Safety Orientation, or equivalent 
experience (engineering degree and a background in range safety). 
Target Audience: NASA, Federal Aviation Administration and Department of Defense 
Range Safety Analysts; range safety personnel in other disciplines; program/project 
managers and engineers who design potentially hazardous systems to operate on a 
range 
The Range Flight Safety Analysis course outline is shown in the graphic below. 
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Range Flight Safety Systems 
The second of three Phase II courses, Range Flight Safety Systems, was taught for the 
first time at Kennedy Space Center in September of 2007 with 15 students in 
attendance. The course size is limited by tours conducted at the Navy Trident trainer 
facility. The course describes required safety responsibilities and flight termination 
system procedures and plans. It also includes flight termination system component 
design, performance, test, and subsystem pre-launch requirements. 
The module then transitions to the applicable flight termination system ground support 
and monitoring equipment, flight termination system analysis, and component test 
history. The course continues with a review of uninhabited aerial vehicle flight 
termination systems, balloon universal termination packages, and the enhanced flight 
termination system. The class concludes with a description of the autonomous flight 
safety system. 
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Prerequisites: 
Completion of NSTC 074, Range Safety Orientation, or equivalent level of experience or 
training, is required 
Completion of NSTC 002, System Safety Fundamentals, or NSTC 008, System Safety 
Workshop, is recommended 
Target Audience: NASA, Federal Aviation Administration, and Department of Defense 
Range Safety personnel working flight safety systems issues; range safety personnel in 
other disciplines; program/project managers and engineers who design potentially 
hazardous systems to operate on a range; personnel who conduct hazardous operations 
on a range 
The Range Flight Safety Systems course outline is shown in the two graphics below. 
I 
Flight Safety System 
I 
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Flight Safety System 
Range Safety Operations Course 
Development of the Range Safety Operations course, the last of three Phase II 
advanced courses, should be completed in early 2007 and will be offered for the first 
time in July 2007. The course is managed by the NASA Safety Training Center and 
taught by several range safety operations professionals from NASA and other federal 
agencies involved in range safety. Unlike previous courses, this course will be taught at 
Wallops Flight Facility to take advantage of its range safety and control room facilities, 
as well as the mobile range safety system assets. 
To ensure mission success and the safety of operations for the range, a formal process 
has evolved among the different ranges to provide range safety operations. This course 
focuses on the roles and responsibilities of the Range Safety Officer for range safety 
operations, as well as real-time support, including pre-launch, launch, flight, landing, and 
required mitigation actions. Launch commit criteria , mission rules, countdown activities, 
and display techniques are presented. 
Additionally, tracking and telemetry, along with vehicle characteristics and range 
generation and checkout, will be covered in detail. Finally, post operations, lessons 
learned, and the use and importance of contingency plans will be discussed. Those 
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participating in the course receive hands-on simulator training and exercises to reinforce range 
safety officer techniques and procedures to successfully conduct launch operations. Due to the 
unique interaction with real-world equipment, a maximum of six students may attend each class. 
Current forecasts are to offer this course annually; however more classes may be added based 
on need. 
The course design document was completed in 2005. The course centers on the topics shown 
in the graphic below. 
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If you wish to take of any of the courses offered , please contact your Center training 
manager or refer to the NSTC web site course catalogue located at: 
http://www6.jsc.nasa.gov/safety/calendar/NSTC/Docs/2007 Catalog.doc 
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Development, Implementation, Support of Range Safety Policy 
Constellation 
Constellation is the combination of large and small systems that will provide humans the 
capabilities necessary to travel and explore the solar system. Constellation will be made 
up of Earth-to-orbit, in-space and surface transportation systems, surface and space-
based infrastructures, power generation, communications systems, maintenance and 
science instrumentation, and robotic investigators and assistants 
In 2006, NASA named the new rockets that will carry the next generation of space 
explorers to the moon and beyond. Ares, the Greek god associated with the planet Mars, 
is a fitting title for NASA's new wave of exploration vehicles by that will one day carry 
explorers to Mars. The new crew exploration vehicle that will carry astronauts to the 
Moon, the International SPace Station, and eventually to Mars was also named in 2006. 
This vehicle is called Orion after one of the brightest most recognizable star formations 
in the universe. By 2020, NASA astronauts will once again walk on the surface of the 
moon and prepare for their eventual journey to the planet Mars. 
Ares I 
Ares I is the vehicle that will send the next generation of explorers into space. Also 
known as the crew launch vehicle, this is a single, two-stage rocket derived from the 
Space Shuttle's solid rocket booster. The first stage is a reusable, five-segment, solid 
rocket booster much like the four-segment booster the Shuttle uses today. The solid 
rocket booster will power the rocket to approximately 200,000 feet where the first stage 
will separate and allow the second stage engine take over. The Ares I rocket is also 
capable of lifting more than 55,000 pounds into low Earth orbit. The prime contract for 
the first stage belongs to ATK Thiokol of Brigham City, Utah. 
The second stage engine is a liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen fueled J-2X, similar to the 
engine used on the second stage of the Apollo rocket. Sitting atop the five-segment 
booster is the Orion crew exploration vehicle. This capsule will be the short-term home 
for astronauts launched from Kennedy Space Center and will ferry crews to and from the 
Moon and the International Space Station. Pratt and Whitney Rocketdyne in Canoga 
Park, California is the prime contractor for the engine of the second stage. 
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Ares V 
The Ares V, also known as the cargo launch vehicle, is 360 feet tall and capable of lifting 
more than 286,000 pounds to low Earth orbit. This lift is achieved by using two five-
segment solid rocket boosters mounted on either side of a similar, but larger version of 
the Shuttle's external tank that is powered by five, RS-68, liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen 
engines. This vehicle will be used to carry cargo and other equipment into orbit with a 
final destination of the Moon or even Mars. 
The first stage and core stage will power the vehicle toward orbit until it is time for 
separation from the upper stage. This upper stage, known as the earth departure stage, 
is powered by a J-2X engine and is responsible for putting the vehicle into a circular 
orbit. Once this orbit is achieved, the Orion crew exploration vehicle will dock with the 
earth departure stage and begin its journey to the Moon and beyond. 
Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle 
The Orion crew exploration vehicle will carry astronauts to and from the Moon, Mars, 
and the International Space Station. The capsule is deSigned in a similar fashion to that 
of the Apollo capsule of the past except this time it will be roughly three times larger. The 
vehicle is designed to be aerodynamically stable for nominal entries as well as 
emergency aborts. 
This version of the crew exploration vehicle will have modern materials and 
manufacturing processes, advanced avionics, improved operational capability, and the 
ability to land on ground rather than water. The crew exploration vehicle rests atop the 
Ares I rocket and will be capable of docking with the International Space Station as well 
as the earth departure stage of the Ares V cargo launch vehicle. The primary contract to 
design and build Orion was awarded to the Lockheed Martin Corporation of Bethesda, 
Maryland in September 2006. 
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Lunar Surface Access Module 
The lunar surface access module will carry astronauts to and from the surface of the 
Moon. It is launched into orbit within the Ares V configuration. A composite shroud or 
fairing protects the module when it sits atop the earth departure stage during launch. 
The Orion crew exploration vehicle will mate with the earth departure stage and lunar 
surface access module and move towards lunar orbit. Once this orbit is achieved, the 
astronauts will migrate to the lunar module and make their way to the moon's surface. 
The Orion vehicle will remain in lunar orbit while the lunar module descends towards the 
surface of the moon. 
The lunar module is very similar to the lunar vehicle used for the Apollo missions, except 
this module is larger, with the capability of carrying four astronauts, and has the ability to 
land almost anywhere on the Moon's surface. When it is time for the astronauts to leave 
the Moon's surface, the lunar vessel will depart from the lunar surface access module 
and carry them back to Orion where they will make their final trip home. 
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Range Safety Challenges 
As with all previous launches and programs, safety will continue to be an important issue 
to the Constellation Program and Range Safety. Not only is it important that these 
vehicles succeed in reaching areas of the universe that were once believed 
unreachable, but it is equally important to protect the public, the astronauts, and the 
workforce that make these dreams possible. 
As we headed into 2006, we were already assisting the Constellation Program in 
defining range safety related requirements. This effort began with a complete review of 
the NASA Range Safety NPR 8715.5 to identify areas applicable to the program. The 
review was followed by the establishment of the Launch Constellation Range Safety 
Panel, co-chaired by Johnson Space Center/Flight DeSign and Dynamics Division and 
the 45th Space Wing Safety Office with NASA Range Safety and many other NASA and 
Air Force personnel as members. After panel members were determined, an initial 
technical interchange meeting was held at Kennedy Space Center in early 2006. 
Several questions still remain unanswered about the future of the Constellation program. 
Some of the most important issues related to Range Safety are as follows: 
• Will the flight termination system include a linear shape charge extension to cover 
the aft segment of the solid rocket boosters for the test flights? 
• What type of ascent and reentry requirements will be implemented? 
• At what frequency will the flight termination system operate? 
• Will the Constellation program implement any new technologies pertaining to the 
flight termination system, such as the enhanced flight termination system? 
• What type of tracking and communications requirements will be implemented? 
These are just a few of the important questions that must be answered by Range Safety 
to ensure public safety. The Constellation Program and Range Safety are committed to 
making the Constellation family of vehicles the safest and most reliable launch vehicles 
ever to launch from Kennedy Space Center. 
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Range Safety Variance Process 
During 2006, NASA Range Safety worked diligently to finalize KDP-KSC-P-3629, NASA 
Range Safety Variance process as directed by NPR 8715.5. The plan was signed in 
June 2006 and provided the opportunity to use the new process to document existing 
range safety non-compliances held by the Air Force Eastern and Western Ranges. 
NASA Range Safety obtained all past and current non-compliances related to the 
Launch Services Program and the Space Shuttle Program. 
We conducted a review of the technical rationale used in the disposition of each 
variance, provided our own independent evaluation of the rationale, and documented all 
of them on the NASA Range Safety Variance Request form. NASA Range Safety also 
established a database and hard copy file of all documentation. 
The process outlined in the graphic below is used for each new range safety related 
variance for both Launch Services Program and the Space Shuttle Program and will be 
used for the Constellation Program as well. 
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Range Safety Risk Process 
A new procedure, KSC Space Flight Risk Assessment process, KDP-KSC-P-3628, 
outlining the process for managing range safety risks for launch and entry at Kennedy 
Space Center was approved in June 2006. 
The objectives of the process are as follows: 
• To ensure the safety of the Kennedy Space Center workforce and visitors during 
launches 
• To comply with KCA 1305, Memorandum of Agreement Among the 4f1h Space 
Wing, The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's John F. Kennedy 
Space Center, and The Space Shuttle Program Office for Range Safety 
• To comply with NPR 8715.5, NASA Range Safety Program 
The process also outlines the requirements for the KSC risk assessment board should 
additional mitigation action be required to reduce risk to an acceptable level for launch 
or landing operations. The process flowpath is shown in the graphic below. 
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Range Safety Launch Support Policy 
On 19 January 2006, NASA Range Safety supported the NASA Pluto New Horizons 
launch at the Eastern Range's Range Operations Control Center at Cape Canaveral Air 
Force Station. This was the first time NASA Range Safety supported a launch other than 
the Space Shuttle. This historic effort took many months of planning and negotiations 
between all parties to determine the appropriate amount of involvement, not to mention 
the coordination of resources required to support two additional" console positions in the 
Mission Control Room at the Range Operations Control Center. 
A New Way of Operating 
Through agreements between NASA, the 45th Space Wing, and the 30th Space Wing, 
NASA Range Safety provides operational support to relay range safety information to 
NASA launch team managers, as well as ensuring NASA Procedural Requirements 
(NPR 8715.5) are met during pre-launch, launch, and post-launch operations. Currently, 
there is a Memorandum of Agreement between the 45th Space Wing, NASA/Kennedy 
Space Center, and the Space Shuttle Program that outlines the procedures for NASA 
Range Safety Support. We recently completed a draft Memorandum of Agreement with 
the 30th Space Wing Safety Office to formalize support at the Western Range. 
This new way of operating bridges some of the gaps from the past. The processes allow 
for direct communications with the Air Force Commander's Advisory Board, Safety 
Advisors, and Mission Flight Control Officers on matters of range safety, such as flight 
safety systems, flight safety analysis, tracking and instrumentation outages and 
limitations, as well as user vehicle anomalies. With timely and more concise information, 
a launch abort or scrub may be avoided, saving time and money. However, the most 
important aspect of this cooperative effort is the fact that this type of partnership is the 
most practical and effective way to do business when it comes to ensuring public safety. 
Challenges 
Several challenges were associated with such a bold new approach. Providing console 
space in the respective range operations centers was one of the major hurdles of the 
new operations. This meant that Operations Directives that list range support 
requirements had to be updated to include the new NASA Range Safety positions. 
Furthermore, communication support plans and entry authorizations needed to be 
updated and approved to ensure full inclusion into the range safety process. It was vital 
that NASA Range Safety personnel have the capability to communicate with both the Air 
Force and NASA team on safety issues quickly and accurately. 
Additionally, a process for receiving Air Force generated launch documentation to 
support launch activities needed to be in place. NASA Range Safety requested the same 
documents used by the Mission Flight Control Officers and Safety Technical Advisors. 
To ensure NASA Range Safety was in lock-step with the Range, it was determined that 
waivers and variances, the Launch Support Plan (Range Countdown Checklist), Mission 
Flight Control Officer Countdown Checklist, Estimated Coverage Plan for 
instrumentation, Flight Control Instrumentation Worksheet, Range Safety Operations 
Requirements and Supplements, and general and special Mission Rules as well as other 
documentation would be provided to ensure everyone was working from the same page 
for an orderly flow of events and discussions during the countdown. 
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Other processes were needed to ensure that NASA Range Safety personnel were 
included and advised of meetings, readiness reviews, and integrated crew exercises tied 
into pre-launch processes. Since the Program Support Managers are the Range focal 
point for launch support meetings as well as the liaison between the Range and the 
vehicle provider, they have proven invaluable in providing this information to NASA 
Range Safety. 
Benefits 
This cooperative effort was further demonstrated when NASA Range Safety supported 
two launches (Pegasus/ST-5 and Delta II/CloudSat-CALIPSO) at Vandenberg Air Force 
Base, California and STEREO mission launched from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. 
To date this effort has paid many benefits, specifically opening the lines of , 
communications and cooperation between NASA, the Air Force, and the Range User to 
new levels. With this solid foundation, our collective processes continue to evolve as we 
work together to ensure public safety. 
26 
Range Commanders Council 
The Range Commanders Council is dedicated to serving the technical and operational 
needs of United States test, training, and operational ranges. The council was formed in 
August 1951 to preserve and enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of member 
ranges, thereby increasing their research and development, operational test and 
evaluation, and training and readiness capabilities. The responsibility of the Range 
Commanders Council is to proactively share insights and products with various services 
and Department of Defense organizations. 
Member Ranges 
Army, Air Force, Navy and Department of Energy ranges are shown in the graphic below 
and their locations identified in the following table. 
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Locations of Member Ranges 
Army Air Force Navy Department of 
Energy 
Aberdeen Test Center, 
Aberdeen Proving Ground, 
Aberdeen, MD 
30th Space Wing, 
Vandenberg Air Force 
Base, CA 
NAVAIR Atlantic Department of Energy 
Dugway Proving Ground, 
Dugway, UT 
Electronic Proving Ground, 
Ft Huachuca, AZ 
National Training Center, 
Fort Irwin, CA 
Reagan Test Site, APO AP 
45th Space Wing, Patrick 
Air Force Base, FL 
Air Armament Center, 
Eglin Air Force Base, FL 
Air Force Flight Test 
Center, Edwards Air 
Force Base, CA 
Arnold Engineering 
Development Center, 
Tullahoma, TN 
White Sands Missile Goldwater Range, Luke 
Range, White Sands, NM Air Force Base, AZ . 
Yuma Proving Ground, 
Yuma, AZ 
Ranges, Patuxent River, Nevada Test Site 
MD 
NAVAIR Pacific 
Ranges, China Lake 
and Point Mugu, CA 
Naval Undersea 
Warfare Center Division 
Keyport,Keyport,WA 
Naval Undersea 
Warfare Center Division 
Newport, Newport,RI 
Pacific Missile Range 
Facility, Kekaha, HI 
Range Commanders Council Objectives and Organization 
The primary objectives of the Range Commanders Council are listed below: 
• Discuss and resolve common range issues in an organized forum 
• Exchange information and ideas, thereby minimizing duplication 
• Conduct joint investigations pertaining to research, design, development, 
procurement, and testing 
• Coordinate major or special procurement actions 
• Develop operational test procedures and standards for present and future range use 
• Encourage the interchange of technical systems and equipment 
To meet these objectives, the Range Commanders Council is divided into a number of 
specialized groups organized to address technical issues of concern and interest to the 
various member ranges. Several committees can be formed under each group. Of 
particular interest to range safety are the Range Safety Group and two committees 
under that group. 
• Flight Termination Systems Committee 
• Risk Committee 
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Range Safety Group 
Through standardization, 
development, and 
continuous improvement, the 
Range Safety Group 
supports the safe conduct of 
hazardous operations on 
test, training, and operational 
ranges and related facilities. 
The 98th Range Safety 
Group meeting was held at 
White Sands Missile Range 
in April. The main committee 
and the Flight Termination 
Systems Committee and 
Risk Committee met 
concurrently. 
Highlights of the meeting 
included a special briefing 
and video of the autonomous 
flight safety system sounding 
rocket test conducted at 
White Sands Missile Range 
on April 5th and the tour of 
the range on the third day. 
Secreta nat , 
I. 
Data Redudiell And Co puler Croup 
El«lronie n-aj«lory M~asure_ Cnup 
MdtorololY C ..... , 
Modcl· And Simulalion Group 
OpliraJ y ttmJ Group 
Jlan3e Akspau Grou, 
~e Environmental Group 
1W!&t O~radon Croup 
KlIJI&e aldy "roup 
Su ...... billty C .... up 
TclHodl unltalion And Timin. Group 
T~lmIetry Group 
nunoatu ySIe. Group 
Ad 11K C .... ellf 
The Naval Air War Center, Patuxent River, Maryland hosted the 99th Range Safety 
Group meeting in October. The main committee and the Flight Termination Systems, 
Risk, and Laser committees met at that time. Highlights included special briefings by the 
Southern California Offshore Range and the Joint Strike Fighter Program, the election of 
new Range Safety Group officers, and a tour of Pax River. Walt Montieth, Air Armament 
Center at Eglin Air Force Base, was elected the new Range Safety Group Secretary. 
Michael Young moved from Vice Chair to Chair, and Greg Speth moved into the Vice 
Chair position. Southern California Offshore Range also petitioned for and received 
approval to join the Range Safety Group as an Associate Member. 
Flight Termination Systems Committee. The Flight Termination Systems Committee 
provides a forum for all issues and technologies related to the flight termination system 
effort. One of the tasks the committee was asked to complete was the rewrite of RCC 
319, Flight Termination Systems Commonality Standard. RCC 319 establishes common 
flight termination system design and testing requirements for different programs and 
different ranges. This document is being revised to update, clarify, and amend certain 
sections and requirements to reflect new technologies, studies, and lessons learned. 
The task to rewrite RCC 319 began in 2003 and is expected to be completed in early 
2007. Members of numerous ranges and organizations are involved in the rewrite to 
obtain a variety of inputs and ideas from many different sources and ranges. Other 
topics being discussed by this committee include emerging technologies such as the 
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enhanced flight termination system, autonomous flight safety system, and subminiature 
flight safety system as well as potential problems such as the radar interference to flight 
termination system receivers. 
Risk Committee. In early 2004, the Range Safety Group initiated Phase II of a Risk and 
Lethality Commonality Team effort to revise RCC 321, Common Risk Criteria for 
National Test Ranges. Because injury criteria were not defined during Phase I of the 
Risk and Lethality Commonality Team effort, the Department of Defense major range 
and test facility bases have diverged from use of the standard since it addresses 
acceptable risk criteria pertaining only to fatalities. The second phase of the Risk and 
Lethality Commonality Team effort has focused on establishing acceptable risk criteria 
based on casualties. 
The Range Safety Group also recommended that RCC 321 be updated and expanded to 
include flight safety hazards in addition to inert debris. The Risk and Lethality 
Commonality Team II was initially established as an ad hoc committee under the Range 
Safety Group. However, after a few meetings, the identification of additional risk-related 
topics, and the more detailed development of tasks, the need for a standing committee 
was realized. In February 2005, the Risk and Lethality Commonality Team was renamed 
the Risk Committee with a specific objective to rewrite RCC 321. 
The committee has spent the last three years focusing on establishing updated 
acceptable risk criterion and developing detailed supporting rationale for inert debris and 
other range hazards, including distant focusing overpressure and toxics. The group has 
also decided to establish an aggregated risk criterion, evaluating the combination of all 
launch hazard risk against one acceptable level. The group has examined and 
incorporated discussion and/or criterion for the following topics: 
• Major activities required to conduct the entire risk management process and 
considerations to address hazards beyond just inert debris 
• Requirements for computational models used to analyze the risks posed by inert 
and explosive debris 
• Hazard thresholds for inert and explosive debris as well as screening criteria for 
other hazards including toxics and distant focusing overpressure 
• Aircraft and ship risk management requirements 
• Catastrophic risk 
• Space craft protection 
In October 2006, the Risk Committee submitted the final draft of the revised RCC 321 to 
the Range Safety Group for review. The revised document is expected to follow the 
standard Range Commander Council issue process. The Risk Committee is currently in 
the process of developing a new task statement for the upcoming session with potential 
topics to include: 
• Space craft protection to include satellite protection beyond orbital insertion, safety 
responsibility for space systems, and space craft protection for exo-atmospheric and 
orbital debris hazards 
• Reusable launch vehicle and other controlled reentry related issues 
• Conditional risk criterion for foreseeable conditions 
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• Treatment of uncertainty in risk assessments 
• Asset protection 
• Hazard thresholds for land vehicles 
• Assessment and application of catastrophic risk 
• Minor injuries 
These topics will be further developed at the next Range Safety Group/Risk Committee 
meeting in April 2007 to be co-hosted by NASA - Kennedy Space Center and Patrick Air 
Force Base. 
NASA Range Safety will continue to work with the Range Commanders Council and the 
vario,us ranges that comprise the forum to ensure that NASA is involved in the new, 
ground breaking technologies as well as potential issues that could change the way we 
send astronauts into space. 
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Common Standards Working Group 
The Common Standards Working Group is an interagency partnership established to 
develop, publish, and maintain Air Force and the Federal Aviation Administration, 
Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation common launch safety 
requirements and practices to protect the public during launch and re-entry operations. 
The charter for the Common Standards Working Group implemented the Memorandum 
of Agreement Between the Department of the Air Force and Federal Administration on 
Safety for Space Transportation and Range Activities at the direction of the Senior 
Steering Group. The memorandum, dated 16 January 2001, stated that the AF and the 
FAA would work together to achieve common safety requirements for launches . 
. The tangible benefits from the creation of common safety standards include a stable 
framework of safety requirements for the U.S. space launch industry and minimal 
administrative burdens for the government and commercial sectors. Another welcome 
by-product is the creation of a system of checks and balances between the two 
agencies. 
Membership 
The working group is a government-only forum. Commercial launch industry 
representatives are not permitted to participate due to the Department of Transportation 
policy regarding rulemaking. Membership in the group consists of representatives of the 
Air Force and Federal Administration Association organizations that are responsible for 
the development and implementation of launch and re-entry safety requirements, 
practices, activities, and policies and includes. 
• 14th Air Force, Safety, A3 
• 30th Space Wing, Safety 
• 45th Space Wing, Safety 
• Air Force Space Command 
• Air Force Systems Command 
• Director of National Security, Space Integration, Office of the Under Secretary of the 
Air Force 
• Federal Aviation Administration, Associate Administrator for Commercial Space 
Transportation 
• Headquarters United States Air Force 
• Space and Missile Center 
NASA, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Missile Defense Agency are also 
current members of the group. 
Senior Steering Group 
The Senior Steering Group provides senior executive leadership and guidance to the 
Common Standards Working Group to accomplish its objectives. The Senior Steering 
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Group meets semi-annually, or more frequently as needed, and is co-chaired by the 
following: 
• The Federal Aviation Administration Associate Administrator for Commercial Space 
Transportation 
• The Director of National Security Space Integration, Headquarters United States Air 
Force 
• The Director of Space Operations and Integration, Headquarters United States Air 
Force 
• The Director of Air and Space Operations, Headquarters Air Force Space Command 
Past Accomplishments 
The Common Standards Working Group has made significant progress since its 
inception, drafting and publishing the Range Safety User Requirements Manual 
(AFSPCMAN 91-710) in July 2004. Additionally, the Federal Aviation Administration 
issued its first Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in October 2000. It then issued a 
supplemental notice in July 2002 and published and posted its second supplemental 
notice in 2003. In conjunction with the new rule, the Common Standards Working Group 
also developed a Launch Safety Site Assessment and a Memorandum of Understanding 
between the FAA and the Air Force for resolving requests for relief from common launch 
safety requirements. 
Also, in 2003, the working group agreed on a framework for determining probabilities of 
failure for new expendable launch vehicles. The group established a list of factors that 
are requirements and practices used by the Federal Aviation Administration and the Air 
Force to protect public safety during launch and re-entry. The Federal Aviation 
Administration requirements have been codified in 14 Code of Federal Regulations, 
Chapter III. 
At Air Force Space Command ranges, the common safety standards are implemented 
through Air Force Space Command Range Safety documents. Since the vehicles in 
question were new with little existing empirical data, it was determined that initial 
evaluations would be conducted based in part on data from vehicles developed and 
launched under similar circumstances. An independent assessment of the proposed 
requirements and methods was conducted, and the Common Standards Working Group 
published the final guidelines in 2004. 
Current Projects 
The Common Standards Working Group and its committee are currently working on the 
following projects. 
AFSPCMAN 91-711. Recently, the Common Standards Working Group developed 
AFSPCMAN 91-711, Launch Safety Requirements for Air Force Space Command 
Organizations. This document is scheduled for publication in 2007. The manual 
describes the Launch Safety (formerly known as Range Safety) authorities, 
responsibilities, and functions of organizations internal to Air Force Space Command, 
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including defining and implementing the Launch Safety Program policy and 
responsibilities for Space Command ranges. 
AFSPCMAN 91-712. Headquarters Air Force Space Command Safety made a decision 
to revise and combine the computer and software requirements for Range Users 
(currently in AFSPCMAN 91-710) and the computer and software requirements for 
Range Operators and Acquirers into a single document. These requirements will be 
published as AFSPCMAN 91-712, Range Software Requirements. Space Command 
convened the Common Standards Working Group to develop and coordinate these 
requirements. The draft computer and software requirements were sent to industry, 
Range Users (including NASA), and Range Operators and Acquirers for review and 
comment. This document is scheduled for publication in 2007. 
Reusable Launch Vehicles. The Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) Working Group was 
formed in April 2006 to develop public safety requirements for the launch and recovery 
of reusable launch vehicles. Membership includes the Air Force and Federal Aviation 
Administration, with participation from NASA. The group was formed for the following 
reasons: 
• When AFSPCMAN 91-710, Range Safety User Requirements, was released in July 
2004, reusable launch vehicle requirements had not been adequately addressed. 
• When the potential for reusable launch vehicle users on Air Force Space Command 
ranges increased, Air Force and Federal Aviation Administration leadership 
expressed their desire that reusable launch vehicle safety requirements be 
developed expeditiously to aid potential users in their design efforts. 
• The flight of Spaceship One showed that entrepreneurs developing reusable launch 
vehicles is becoming a reality. 
• The Space Shuttle Columbia accident revealed that safety concerns for the public 
during launch vehicle reentry needed to be addressed in more detail. 
The Reusable Launch Vehicle Working Group meets weekly via teleconferences and 
has initiated development of public safety requirements for unmanned reusable launch 
vehicles. This effort began in October 2006, and development of safety requirements for 
manned reusable launch vehicles began in November 2006. The goal is to have a full 
set of public safety requirements for reusable launch vehicles developed by early 2007 
for incorporation into AFSPCMAN 91-710 and Federal Aviation Administration's 
Reusable Launch Vehicle Public Rule. The figure below shows the evolution of the major 
safety documents from EWR 127-1 to the 91 document series. 
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NASA Range Safety has been an integral part of the Common Standards Working 
Group since 2004. As new and emerging space launch technologies surface, the group 
will continue to provide a forum through which the Air Force, the Federal Aviation 
Administration, NASA, and other government agencies can communicate on further 
development and implementation of common range safety standards. The goal of this 
group has been, and will always be, to maintain public safety in all phases of launch 
activities. 
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Unmanned Aircraft Systems Working Group Update 
In August of 2005, the Kennedy Space Center's Applied Technology Directorate 
formalized activities for the developmel1t of an unmanned aircraft systems program to 
support future missions at Kennedy Space Center, Patrick Air Force Base, and Cape 
Canaveral Air Force Station. To aid in meeting program requirements, the Air Force's 
45th Space Wing Safety Office, the Kennedy Space Center Range Safety Office, and the 
Applied Technology Directorate formed a working group to develop three joint initiatives: 
• Cape Canaveral Spaceport Unmanned Aircraft System Range Safety Requirements 
• Cape Canaveral Spaceport Unmanned Aircraft System Flight Operations Manual 
• Cape Canaveral Spaceport Unmanned Aircraft System Concept of Operations. 
Working Group Goals 
The working group's efforts are supporting near-term goals of Kennedy Space Center 
and the 45th Space Wing to provide enhanced mission support from mobile aerial 
platforms. Specifically, the goals are to incorporate unmanned aircraft systems to 
supplement existing range functions of tracking and surveillance and to respond on short 
notice to supplement existing range functions. 
The joint documentation will provide requirements for all unmanned aircraft system 
operations to be conducted at Kennedy Space Center, Cape Canaveral Air Force 
Station, and Patrick Air Force Base. Although NASA currently conducts unmanned 
aircraft systems operations at Dryden Flight Research Center, Goddard Space Flight 
CenterlWaliops Flight Facility, Ames Research Center, and Langley Research Center, 
Kennedy Space Center and the 45th Space Wing have been contracted by several 
parties interested in conducting operations at the Cape Canaveral Spaceport. 
Kennedy Space Center and the 45th Space Wing recognize that Cape Canaveral 
Spaceport poses many unique challenges due to the complexities of human space flight 
and expendable rocket flight operations as well as the existence of a large number of 
high-valued assets, such as launch complexes, fuel storage facilities, launch vehicles, 
and supporting equipment within the confines of Kennedy Space Center, Patrick Air 
Force Base, and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. These challenges require a 
fundamental change from Range Safety's current paradigm for launching space vehicles 
to one that is includes unmanned aircraft systems operations. 
Document Review 
To address these challenges, the working group conducted an extensive document 
review to aid in determining the compulsory subtopics to be addressed in a requirements 
document and a flight operations manual. Once completed, an exhaustive outline was 
developed and sections were assigned to personnel to construct requirements based on 
subject matter expertise. The working group was further challenged to incorporate future 
concepts of operating unmanned aircraft systems in the National Airspace. 
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Responsibilities 
The 45th Space Wing will be responsible for managing the requirements for unmanned 
aircraft systems flight operations at Kennedy Space Center, Patrick Air Force Base, and 
Cape Canaveral Air Force Station through the Cape Canaveral Spaceport Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems Range Safety Requirements document. The 45th Space Wing Safety 
Office has compiled a draft requirements document and it is in the data review/update 
phase to ensure completeness, accuracy, and clarity. 
Kennedy Space Center will be responsible for managing the process for unmanned 
aircraft systems flight operations at Kennedy Space Center, Patrick Air Force Base, and 
Cape Canaveral Air Force Station through the Cape Canaveral Spaceport Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems Flight Operations Manual. The Applied Technology Directorate has 
compiled the draft Flight Operations Manual that describes the processes and 
procedures for gaining unmanned aircraft systems flight operations approval from NASA 
and the 45th Space Wing. This manual includes an air worthiness and range safety 
certification approval process; describes operational agreements between NASA, the 
45th Space Wing, and the Federal Aviation Administration; and lists project and program 
interfaces and standards. 
The Cape Canaveral Spaceport Unmanned Aircraft Systems Concept of Operations 
document describes a generic model for unmanned aircraft systems requirements and 
flight operations at Cape Canaveral Spaceport. Kennedy Space Center will be 
responsible for developing and maintaining this document. The document will assist the 
potential user and the range by providing a generic end-to-end model of mission 
timelines, support staff, equipment, and range services for a typical unmanned aircraft 
systems mission at Cape Canaveral Spaceport. The draft will be completed by the 
Applied Technology Directorate the first quarter of 2007. 
Next Phase 
The next phase for Cape Canaveral Spaceport unmanned aircraft systems document 
reviews will expand the working group to include members from the Federal Aviation 
Administration, other NASA centers, and Department of Defense ranges to ensure 
accuracy, consistency, and comprehensiveness. 
In the future, unmanned aircraft systems operations at Kennedy Space Center, Patrick 
Air Force Base, and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station will support mission 
requirements, program requirements, and instrument testing for NASA, the 45th Space 
Wing, other federal and state agencies, educational institutions, and commercial entities. 
It is not the intention of NASA or the 45th Space Wing to authorize flight tests for the sole 
purpose of testing the flight capability of an unmanned aircraft systems airframe. The 
working group is striving to encompass all aspects of Range Safety that will maximize 
the protection of personnel, property, other aircraft, and national assets. 
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Launch and Landing Plans for the Space Shuttle 
NASA Range Safety initiated an interagency comprehensive update of Kennedy Space 
Center specific risk management criteria for the launch and landing of the Space Shuttle, 
as well as standardized landing criteria for Johnson Space Center, Edwards Air Force 
Base, and White Sands Missile Complex. The results of these efforts culminated in the 
update of two Kennedy Space Center Plans: KSC-PLN-2805, Range Safety Risk 
Management Plan for the Launch and Landing of the Space Shuttle and KSC-PLN-2804, 
KSC Range Safety Implementation Plan for the Landing of the Space Shuttle and the 
backup landing sites plans. 
The Risk Management Plan 
The Kennedy Space Center Range Safety Risk Management Plan for Launch and 
Landing of the Space Shuttle outlines the agency's risk management process consisting 
of risk assessment, hazard containment, and risk mitigation strategies for launch and 
landing of the Space Shuttle, while addressing the NASA policy regarding range safety 
(NPR 8715.5 Range Safety Program). It is anticipated that Kennedy Space Center pre-
launch and landing planning will result in meeting all the NPR launch criteria for falling 
debris, toxics, and far-field overpressure hazards. 
The plan will be updated by the Kennedy Space Center Range Safety Manager at least 
every two years to reflect current operations and risk levels. The risk management 
process for launch and landing the Space Shuttle includes established Air Force and 
NASA processes using containment and risk analysis as well as a Kennedy Space 
Center risk assessment process to address potential situations if residual risk violates 
policy criteria contained in NPR 8715.5. This risk management process involves pre-
launch and landing preparation and real-time communications between the Air Force 
and Kennedy Space Center and results in a strong risk management methodology. 
The Implementation Plan 
The Kennedy Space Center Range Safety Implementation Plan for Landing of the Space 
Shuttle outlines hazard containment and risk mitigation strategies used to implement the 
Launch and Landing Risk Management Plan for the Space Shuttle in accordance with 
NPR 8715.5. The goal is to meet all the individual and collective risk criteria for falling 
debris during nominal end-of-mission, return-to-Iaunch-site operations. The plan is a 
combined effort, with Johnson Space Center providing the detailed risk analysis and 
Kennedy Space Center providing input data and assessing the results. 
Kennedy provides Johnson with a population database for Kennedy Space Center 
(visitors and workforce) for use in their entry risk model. This data provides the expected 
numbers of people as well as their planned locations during entry. In turn, Johnson 
Space Center/Flight Design and Dynamics Division provides Kennedy Space Center 
with a detailed listing of expectation of casualty results for the public and workforce on 
Kennedy Space Center property. The data also highlight locations of high individual and 
collective casualty expectation and establishes keep-out zones that identify areas within 
which the individual probability of casualty (Pc) is greater than the NPR 8715.5 criteria 
permits. 
The Kennedy Space Center Range Safety Manager, External Relations, Protective 
Services, and Shuttle Processing/Launch and Landing worked together to develop this 
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plan that addresses the requirement to secure specified keep-out zones and to notify 
visitors and nonmission-essential workforce of contingency actions during the launch 
and landing of the Space Shuttle. 
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Flight Safety System Challenges 
Range Safety is often faced with many challenges when trying to ensure the protection 
of the public, the local workforce, and property. These challenges must be met with 
steadfast determination and urgency in order to ensure that public safety and mission 
success are preserved. One of the biggest challenges Range Safety dealt with in 2006 
was the frequency interference issue between onboard flight termination system 
receivers used to independently terminate an errant vehicle and other radar systems 
used in a local area for various mission related and non-mission related support. 
Frequency Dilemma 
As noted above, one of the Range Safety's most important and ongoing issues involves 
flight termination system frequencies. For many years, 416.5 megahertz has been used 
as a flight termination system frequency for many years at the Eastern and Western 
ranges. However, because of overcrowding of that frequency in the 1990s, the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration directed the Department of Defense 
to stop use of 416.5 megahertz for flight termination systems no later than the last day of 
calendar year 2006. 
The National Telecommunications and Information Administration announced this 
change in August 2000. The reason for the change is that ultra high frequency wideband 
systems, such as flight termination systems, are required to operate in the 420-450 
megahertz spectrum. 400-420 megahertz is reserved for narrow band systems. So the 
Eastern and Western ranges chose 421 megahertz as the center frequency to be used 
for flight termination systems on launch vehicles. 
Interference at 421-450 Megahertz 
During two recent launches at Vandenberg Air Force Base, it was discovered that the 
flight termination system receivers were undergoing interference problems. After 
research and several studies were performed, it was found that a high power radar 
system at Beale Air Force Base over 300 miles away was the cause of the interference. 
Beale Air Force Base maintains an upgraded early warning radar system called PAVE 
PAWS that operates in the same frequency of 400-450 megahertz. This upgraded early 
warning radar system is much more powerful than the command transmitter sites used 
for range operations. 
If the radar is operating at the same frequency 
as the command transmitter sites and command 
receiver decoders, the command receiver 
decoders could experience interference and be 
unable to process commands from the 
command transmitter site. At worst, this 
interference could prevent the termination of an 
erratic vehicle that could be endangering public 
safety. 
The graph shows the interference between 
PAVE PAWS at Beale Air Force Base and a 
secure receiver that is used on various 
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launch vehicles. The pilot tone is used to check the health and status of the receiver; a 
pilot tone dropout means that the receiver is not able to receive and/or process 
commands at that moment. 
PAVE PAWS systems are 
also located at Clear Air 
Force Base in Alaska (see 
right) and Otis Air National 
Guard Base at Cape Cod, 
Massachusetts. The PAVE 
PAWS radars located at 
Clear and Cape Cod are 
early warning radars, not 
upgraded early warning 
radar like the Beale radar. 
Even though these early 
warning radars are not 
upgraded yet, it is possible 
that they could still pose 
interference issues with 
launches from the Eastern 
and Western ranges. 
Beale Air Force Base has 
mitigated the interference 
before 
by "blanking out" certain segments of the operating frequencies, but this may not be a 
possibil ity much longer because these radars lose a great amount of their capability 
when mitigated. Although PAVE PAWS is the primary focus of this interference issue, 
other radars that can cause problems to range operations may be operating in this 
frequency band. Studies are being performed to identify the characteristics of various 
radar systems that could affect range operations. 
Options 
Several options are currently being examined that would help correct the interference 
problems. Some of the possible solutions and their future implementation are described 
below. 
Option 1. One option is to continue the use of 416.5 megahertz as the main flight 
termination system frequency. 416.5 megahertz has been used for many years and very 
few problems exist at this frequency. Ranges are currently designed to handle this 
frequency, so no new hardware or upgrades would be necessary to support 416.5 
megahertz. 
However, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration has 
instructed that 416.5 megahertz should not be used as a flight termination system 
frequency. To use this frequency for flight termination system operations, ranges must 
submit an "Exception to Policy" to the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration and receive approval. 
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Option 2. Another option is to use 421/425 megahertz as the flight termination system 
frequency. To use this frequency, some sort of mitigation effort must be made to the 
PAVE PAWS radars to ensure that all commands can get through without interference. 
However, as stated earlier, PAVE PAWS loses a great amount of its capability when 
mitigated, so Beale Air Force Base may not always continue to mitigate the radar. 
If the radar cannot be mitigated to negate the interference, one way to improve the 
probability of getting commands through is to use secure receivers. Secure reCeivers are 
still susceptible to PAVE PAWS, but are more robust than standard tone receivers. 
Standard tone receivers are highly susceptible to the interference from PAVE PAWS and 
would have significant trouble processing commands if interfered with by PAVE PAWS. 
Option 3. The next option is to move to an entirely new frequency band. The Range 
Commander's Council Frequency Management Group, Air Force Space Command, and 
some Range Users are leading studies to look at a new frequency band, specifically in 
the 370-380 megahertz range. If approved for flight termination system use by the 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration, dedicated frequencies 
would be authorized within this range for use only by flight termination system users. 
Migrating to a new band in the 370-380 megahertz region with flight termination system 
operations as the primary user reduces the probability of interference. The high power 
radar systems such as PAVE PAWS do not operate in this region. For this option to be 
realized, several criteria must be considered. First, the Eastern and Western ranges 
would have to upgrade their ground equipment to support the migration to a new band. 
The current ground equipment is capable of tuning down to 416.5 megahertz but would 
not be able to accommodate the new lower frequency of 370-380 megahertz. 
Additionally, the airborne side of the equation would also have to be upgraded. The new 
frequency band of 370-380 megahertz will cause the development of a new receiving 
system. Antennas, couplers, and receivers would have to be replaced to accommodate 
the move. This option will take time and money to test and procure new equipment, but 
the end product would be a newly designed system that would operate in a frequency 
band where the flight termination system is the primary user, resolving the interference 
issues seen today. 
Option 4. Another option that would alleviate the interference issues is a future system 
that is currently under development, the autonomous flight safety system. The 
autonomous flight safety system is immune to the previously discussed interference 
issues because it operates using the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System, Ku-
Band, and S-Band. The vehicle would use an onboard autonomous system that detects 
when and if the vehicle violates pre-established flight safety rules. 
If the vehicle violates the pre-determined accepted flight rules, the autonomous system 
responds and initiates the ordnance train. This system is not expected to be available for 
use on expendable launch vehicles or similar vehicles until late 2008 or 2009. In theory, 
the autonomous flight safety system could act alone and be the only method of initiating 
a destruct command, eliminating the need of a flight termination system frequency for 
termination. Although the autonomous flight safety system could theoretically be the sole 
means of initiating a destruct, right now the system is viewed mainly as a potential 
downrange application to be used in conjunctiol1 with an up-range (human-in-the-Ioop) 
command destruct system. 
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Current Status 
Both the Eastern Range and Western ranges are working hard to come up with an 
answer to this issue. In 2006, each range submitted an "Exception to Policy" to remain at 
416.5 megahertz. The Western Range has received approval to stay at 416.5 megahertz 
for all launch vehicles until the end of calendar year 2008. After this date, the Western 
Range must move to the appropriate frequency band whether it is 420-450 megahertz or 
a new band such as 370-380 megahertz or submit a new "Exception To Policy." The 
Eastern Range has submitted an "Exception To Policy" to stay at 416.5 megahertz until 
the end of calendar year 2010; this "Exception To Policy" has not been approved as of 
this writing. 
The Shuttle program has received waiver approval to continue the use of 416.5 
megahertz until the end of program; however the National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration stipulated that all follow-on programs had to comply with its 
mandate to move to 420-450 megahertz. NASA Range Safety is working closely with the 
Department of Defense, Air Force Space Command, and industry to ensure that a viable 
and robust solution is chosen that will not only alleviate the problems seen with 
frequency interference, but also improve the overall confidence and reliability of flight 
termination systems. 
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Independent Assessments 
Orbital Sciences Corporation Programmatic Audit and Review 
In 2006, the NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, Review and 
Assessment Division performed a compliance verification audit of Orbital Sciences 
Corporation's expendable launch vehicle contracts. The specific objective of the audit 
was to verify compliance to NASA's Safety and Mission Assurance requirements 
imposed within Orbital Sciences Corporation Small Expendable Launch Vehicle Services 
contract, NAS1099005, and the NASA Launch Services contract, NNK05LB04B. 
The NASA Audit Team focused on the following six key areas within the contract: 
management; product control; process control; purchasing; safety, reliability, and quality; 
and launch complex. The audit was conducted at three major Orbital Science 
Corporation sites: Dulles, Virginia (April 24-28); Chandler, Arizona (May 8-12); and 
Vandenberg Air Force Base, California (May 15-19). The audit team at Vandenberg is 
shown in the photograph below. 
Audit Team at Vandenberg Air Force Base 
Launch Complex Team 
The NASA Range Safety Office participated on the Launch Complex Team to assess 
Orbital Sciences Corporation's range safety and launch operations safety elements for 
compliance with the contracts and Orbital Sciences Corporation corporate policies, 
plans, procedures, and practices. Team members were Mike Dook, Lead (NASA 
Headquarters, Office of Safety and Mission Assurance), Jon Mullin (NASA 
Headquarters, Office of Safety and Mission Assurance), Tom Palo (Kennedy Space 
Center, Safety and Mission Assurance), and Marv Becker (SRS Technologies, Kennedy 
Space Center). 
Basis for Assessment 
The assessment was based on observations of objective evidence; reviews of written 
procedures, records, and reports; inspections of Orbital Sciences Corporation facilities 
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and launch vehicle flight hardware; and interviews with key personnel. The Launch 
Complex Team also reviewed the contracts and related documents to observe how 
those documents reflect current NASA policy and requirements related to range safety 
and the safety of launch operations. Mr. Dook and Mr. Mullin participated in the review at 
all three Orbital Sciences Corporation facilities. Mr. Palo and Mr. Becker joined the 
Launch Complex Team for the reviews at Chandler and Vandenberg. 
Orbital Sciences Corporation-Dulles, Virginia 
The Launch Complex Team's primary point of contact while at Dulles was the Principal 
Safety Engineer for Pegasus and Taurus. The Principal Safety Engineer is responsible 
for ensuring that the requirements related to flight safety 
are satisfied for each Pegasus and Taurus launch. This 
includes all required coordination with the appropriate 
range safety organizations involved in each launch. The 
Principal Safety Engineer had been in that position for 
less than a year, but the person who held that position 
for the previous six or more years was available for 
consultation. The Launch Complex Team found these 
individuals to possess comprehensive knowledge of the 
Pegasus and Taurus launch vehicles as well as the 
NASA contracts and Orbital Sciences Corporation's 
approach to satisfying the associated requirements. The Launch Complex Team 
reviewed the corporation's corporate policy and internal safety requirements documents, 
Pegasus and Taurus program safety plans and procedures, documentation of mission 
specific safety decisions, and records of the corporation's coordination with range safety 
organizations on flight termination system and other range safety and launch operations 
related issues. 
Orbital Sciences Corporation-Chandler, Arizona 
At Chandler, the primary point of contact for the Launch Complex Team was the Safety 
Manager for Orbital Sciences Corporation's Launch Systems Group. The Safety 
Manager oversees Orbital Sciences 
Corporation's safety program as it pertains to 
the development, production, and operation of 
Orbital Sciences Corporation launch vehicles 
including Pegasus and Taurus. The Launch 
Complex Team also spent significant time with 
the Principal Engineer for Industrial Safety at 
the Chandler facility. The team inspected high 
bays, workshops, and explosives storage 
facilities. The team also reviewed corporate 
policy and internal safety requirements 
documents, Pegasus and Taurus program 
safety plans and procedures, documentation of mission specific safety decisions, 
documentation of safety related engineering changes, and records of the corporation's 
coordination with range safety organizations on flight termination system and other 
range safety and launch operations related issues. 
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Orbital Sciences Corporation-Vandenberg Air Force Base, California 
At Vandenberg, the primary point of contact for the Launch Complex Team was the 
Principal Safety Engineer for Orbital Sciences Corporation's Vandenberg Operations. 
This engineer is responsible for the corporation's safety program at the Vandenberg 
facility and for coordinating with the Air Force on facility and operational/ground safety 
concerns associated with preparing Orbital Sciences Corporation launch vehicles for 
flight. The Principal Safety Engineer at Vandenberg also assists the Principal Safety 
Engineer for Pegasus and Taurus in resolving any flight safety concerns. The Launch 
Complex Team had significant discussions with the corporation's Safety, Reliability and 
Quality Assurance Director and Chief Engineer. 
The team inspected Building 1555, which Orbital Sciences Corporation occupies on 
Vandenberg Air Force Base under a Commercial Space 
Launch agreement. The team reviewed facility safety 
elements, including fire protection, explosive safety, and 
lightning protection. The team also inspected the flight 
hardware currently being processed in Building 1555, 
which included the Pegasus Stages 1, 2, and 3 that will 
be used for NASA's Aeronomy of Ice in the Mesosphere 
mission. The Launch Complex Team walked down the 
flight termination system components currently installed 
on those stages. The team reviewed the safety 
inspection process implemented at Vandenberg, 
documentation of mission specific safety decisions, documentation of safety related 
engineering changes, and records of the corporation's coordination with the Air Force 
range safety organization on facility safety and launch operations related issues. 
Audit Results 
The audit results were briefed to the Launch Services Program and Kennedy Space 
Center management, and all range safety related findings will be tracked to closure by 
Kennedy Space Center Safety and Mission Assurance. The audit final report, dated 7 
July 2006, and all findings can be accessed at the NASA Process Based Mission 
Assurance website https://secureworkgroups.grc.nasa.gov/ under the ELV PA&R 
Compliance Verification Audits Enhanced Secure Work Group. 
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Comm'on Analysis Tools Development 
Public safety risk is evaluated for each NASA mission and must meet acceptable risk 
criterion as described in NASA Procedural Requirement 8715.5; Range Safety Program. 
Historically, each NASA Center was unique in its methodologies and approaches for 
determining risk. Some Centers developed in-house risk modeling capabilities while 
others relied on risk models developed and run by other agencies. 
In September of 2006, range safety representatives from NASA Headquarters and 
Centers met to discuss current risk modeling capabilities and current needs and to 
determine a way ahead for future development. The group, now referred to as the NASA 
Range Safety Analysis Tools Development Committee, quickly identified the need to 
communicate and share resources with other Centers. 
Standardizing Risk Assessment Methods and Processes 
Standardization of the methodologies and processes used to assess risk is at the 
forefront of this committee's charter. Before the issuance of the procedural requirement 
in July of 2005, Centers were responsible for determining appropriate acceptable risk 
criteria for application to their missions. Public safety risk associated with missions 
launched from Department of Defense ranges was not necessarily the responsibility of 
NASA since Department of Defense Directive 3200.11, Major Range and Test Facility 
Base, places the burden of public safety risk solely on the Range Commander. Upon 
issuance of the NASA procedural requirement, a set of standard acceptable risk criterion 
was codified and public safety risk is now a shared responsibility of NASA Center 
Directors and Program Managers. 
Sharing Risk Codes and Expertise 
Based on the clarified requirements and responsibilities outlined in the NASA procedural 
requirement, the committee's tasks for fiscal 2007 will include exploring and developing 
a mechanism for Centers to share risk codes and expertise in an attempt to standardize 
processes. A trial run of this concept was successfully executed at the Wallops Flight 
Facility where risk analysts from Kennedy Space Center and the 45th Space Wing 
performed the required assessments for distant focusing overpressure and toxics risk for 
the Air Force Research Laboratory's TacSat-2 mission. 
Determining Training Needs 
Training needs and requirements for code developers and operators will also be 
evaluated. The committee will determine and evaluate appropriate NASA level 
requirements for code configuration management and verification and validation and 
attempt to standardize these requirements and interpretations across all NASA centers. 
Shared public safety responsibility for NASA missions launched from Department of 
Defense ranges makes understanding and accommodating other agency needs and 
efforts with respect to risk modeling a must for successful completion of committee 
goals. 
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With much work on the horizon, the NASA Range Safety Analysis Tools Development 
Committee looks forward to a successful and productive 2007. 
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Support to Program Operations 
Self-Service Management Tool (SSMT) 
The NASA Safety Manual, NPR 8715.3, specifically states Agency safety priorities for 
the public, astronauts and pilots, the NASA work force, and high value equipment and 
property. NPR 8715.5, NASA Range Safety Program, describes the roles and 
responsibilities, requirements, and procedures for protecting the safety of the public, the 
workforce, and property during range operations associated with flight. To meet these 
procedural requirements, the risk posed to human life and property must be evaluated 
as either acceptable or unacceptable. 
If management determines the risk is too high, then mitigations must be devised to lower 
the assessed risk to an acceptable level. Risk mitigation actions-based on debris, toxic, 
and far-field risk modeling results-must be implemented, monitored, and executed to 
contain or mitigate the hazard to a level acceptable for operations to continue. 
In January 2006, Mr. James Kennedy signed a Center Director's Communication 
regarding the importance of the SSMT database. This communication is included below: 
CD COMM #2006-01 
January 9, 2006 
AA 
CENTER DIRECTOR'S COMMUNICATION 
TO: 
SUBJECT: 
All Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Civil Service and Contractor Employees 
KSC LaunchlLanding Risk Assessments 
In keeping with NASA core values, personnel safety continues to be a high priority not only during day-to-
day activities but also during spaceflight operations. What you may not know is that for every Shuttle and Air 
Force launch or landing, our KSC Range Safety team is assessing personnel risks in the effort to ensure these 
operations are performed safely. Along with vehicle readiness, these assessments are an important factor in 
determining whether an operation can proceed. By necessity, these assessments need to be as accurate as we 
can make them. One of the main factors affecting accuracy is knowing where our personnel are during these 
acti vi ti es. 
Our KSC Range Safety team has been working on a simple way to collect this information, and it involves 
the use of a database called Self-Service Management Tool (SSMT). This database allows you to identify 
your normal work locations/times and now has the ability to capture where you will be located for upcoming 
launch/landing events for those of you who move from one location to another when supporting these 
activities. 
In the coming days, you will see an announcement in the "KSC Daily News," where the team has embedded 
a direct link to the SSMT database input wizard. This wizard is straightforward and should take no more than 
a few minutes to complete. However, if you should have any difficulties utilizing the database, there will be 
contact information within the announcement to assist you. There also will be a Spaceport News article 
providing more information and detailing the importance and relevance of this effort. 
In summary, I fully endorse this initiative and expect all KSC personnel to provide their information into 
SSMT. I understand this is yet another task added to your busy schedules; however, this information is 
essential in our effort to protect you--our most valuable resource. 
To start right now, you can access the following link: SSMT Launch Activitv Wizard. 
Original Signed by 
James W. Kennedy 
Risk Assessments 
NASA Range Safety assesses the risk to the public and personnel for safe operations on 
Kennedy Space Center using computer models to produce risk assessments. These 
assessments are considered for clearance to proceed with a launch and/or landing 
operation. The assessments must be as accurate as possible to reduce the need to 
make conservative decisions. Visitor numbers and locations are typically provided by 
Kennedy Space Center External Relations for popular viewing locations such as the 
Kennedy Space Center Visitor's Center, NASA Causeway and the Launch Complex 39 
Press Site. 
One of the main factors for assessment accuracy is the location of personnel; 
specifically, numbers of personnel, categories of personnel (Mission Essential, 
Operations, or Non-Essential), when personnel work, and where personnel work during 
launch and landing time (buildings, rooms, floors, or outside areas). 
Self-Service Management Tool 
The Self-Service Management Tool is one of the prime information sources Range 
Safety analysts use to collect information to assess risk to Kennedy Space Center 
personnel and property. The program has been in use for some time for a number of 
other activities. 
The current capability captures personnel locations and shift information for normal duty 
hours. NASA Range Safety saw great potential in using this system since personnel 
were familiar with it and it captures information down to the room level. NASA Range 
Safety sponsored adding a launch/landing module to the system database so 
information could be gathered for each launch for all personneL .... not just those 
supporting a particular launch. 
Using the Self-Service Management Tool 
To access the tool database system, visit http://ssmt.ksc.nasa.gov/launchactivitvwizard. 
From the Kennedy Space Center internal home page, a link is provided that will take you 
to the Launch Activity Support Wizard shown below. Clicking the Continue button takes 
you to the next screen. 
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.4J Network Sigll In 
User Name: 
Password: 
Domain: r.:11CSC~=";;''--''--'''i 
Dono 
..... Step Instructions 
CII,k Sf Y". GI .... ry 
To Sign-In to the Wlzerd: 
I . Enur v.u, H.t •• rk u •• r n.m. (th. u •• r 
name u .. d t •• 19n·I" t. 'lour c.mptu.r). 
2. Ent.r 'lour H.t.ork .. u.wo,d (ch. 
p.ssword u .. d to .ltn·1n t. 'leur computtr). 
3. S.I.et v.ur H.t1I'onc Oom.ln (ttl. dom.ln 
us.4 to sl,n· ln t. V.ur compuur). If y.u d. 
not know your Notw.rit Oom.ln. pl •••• 
c.nt.C't 'lour n.afork .dmlnlnator. 
4 . Click the -Submit" button. 
.:Ii . If 'lour .ion·ln attempt: compl.ud 
successfully, y.u .111 b. ulc:en to St.p 2 .f 
the Launch AcU"lty Wlnrd. 
At the Your Normal Locator Information screen. you can view and modify your normal 
locator information. Clicking the Continue button takes you to the Step 3: Add Launch 
Activity screen. 
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.v Verify or Modify Your Normal locator Information 
• Working Phone: 1(321)867-3241 
Mail Code: jsGs-657 ~===m<. 
All. Work Phone: I 
';=:===:::; 
Cell Phone: .(321)759-8612 
Fax: 1(321)867-3236 
Pager: I 
'---------' 
Display Cell: P 
Display Pager: r 
~~~--------------. 
Department: ~ISGS=-=808=I=====:m:::===~ 
Facility: lBASE OPERATIONS BLDG. 
Room: 121405 ~=~--' 
Seating: I Desk :::t 
Work Days: P Moo P Tue P wed P Th.J P Fri r Sat ri SIrt 
StartTime:EJt+t EJMIN 
End Time:~t+t ·OO MIN I Continue 
Click to View Glo ... ry 
To Verify/Update Locator Info: 
1. If your information is correct. no action is 
required. Simply click the CONTINUE button. 
2. NASA Ciyil Servants may not change 
their department (*). 
3. If you do not remember your OHact 
department. facility and room, suggested 
matches are shown as you type in the field. 
Once the desired yalue is displayed, click to 
copy it into the field. 
5. If can't find your department or room 
pluse click on "Item do .. not twist. Click 
to Add". Clicking this will allow you to 
correct your information without waiting ror 
the yalue to be added. 
6. Click CONTINUE when you haye finished 
updating your norm.lloc.tor information. 
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Step 3: Add 
Launch Activity, 
shown in the 
screen to the 
right, allows you 
to enter 
information for 
your location 
during a specific 
launch activity. If 
your location is 
the same as your 
normal locator 
information, just 
check the Use 
Normal Locator 
Information box 
and continue and 
click Submit. 
This step also 
allows you to 
designate your 
launch status 
(Mission 
Essential , 
Operations, Non-
Essential) and 
specific location 
for the launch 
activity. 
~ SSM' LdUII( h ActiVit y WI2'd~"'''IICtosoft Io~e~:.t ~~ploter provIded by Joose 
" 
ISSMT "" ..... --
-
- - -
---- lk~f "lHh~,,1 Hellllldc 
"' Step 1: Networic. SI9n-l~ ..t Stop 2: V.rtfy Parson . 1 tnfo . St,. 3. 11M l_ A<tiIIItlr 
.tJ Where Will You Be During launch Time (T-O)? ....... Step Instructions 
Launch Activ ity: GO€5-O S;lj5;k $I ~I.I il2l1t~ 
r Use _ \.oCata' irlormabon 
1. If you '1'111 b. slttin9 .It the s i ma loc.tion 
MI.sion Essentia l: r. Non-Esenti.1 (' W~.n ElMnb,J r. Ops'tsonne' durin9 I. unch u • normal work day, click ~. ·Us. NotrftJlIl,bcrtor Information-• 
location: .. I<SCJCCAFS r Mol ri I<SCJCCAFS 2. tnctlc.~ .h.th,r vou .. ,.. consld.r.d non· 
F.cUIty: 1 I uunda" mission tssanu,l or operHion .. 1 Pt rso1u). I. For d.flnition. of uch cholet. 
Room: I I ... the Glosury. If 'fOU have .IInv quution 
re9.rd1n9 your cI ... fAution, conuet your 
supe",lso,. 
3. S.lect your Faclltty by typing Into the 
Facility field . A list of poulbl. m.tch .. Ir. 
sho..,n ,IS you type In the field. 
• • Sel.« 'lour Room by typing Into the Room 
fi.ld. A list of possible matchu a,. show,. 
.. 'Iou type in ttl . field . 
S. Click CONnJt.IJf to proc .. d to the newt 
su p In the Wlurd. 
, . Go BaCk II~ Submit I 
1IJ 0cn0 rrr\~loc"'lrtr- 4-
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The Step 4: Add 
Landing Activity 
screen allows you 
to enter the same 
type of 
information that 
you entered for 
launch. Clicking 
Submit takes you 
to the final 
screen. 
1 ~SM T I dun(h A(hvlty Wizard - Microsoft Int~rnet Exploret proYlded by loose . 
ISSMT .... , 
~"'I'_~~~ ~....-H -,: ,.. ~ .. ,.. 1\·"~1"' ''' '' ''1 ~"I 
I aunf h A.huttv c"uppmt \'Iu .ud (<OT " 11 11 4uhf ia " "J'POl t ) II .. p, "" UbM·lfh·lmu l, 
-- -- --
-
.,/ $tao 1 1 Network 519n-ln ..,f Step 21 V,r.f". Pusof".1 Info J ,f Stlip 3 1 Add L.turu:h Ac:tl"'rtv . Sa. 4. 11M L-. AdIoIty 
~ Whoro Will You Bo During Landing? "..... Stop Instructions 
Landing Activity: STS-121 Landno s..wat 'U,k 11 ~I •• Silllua 
r Use the Some Jriorrnatlcn as LILnCh Filllnv out dI. L.andlnv Acttvity Is Idtft'ttnl 
r Use NormaIlccator Jriorrnatlcn to the ,'OCU, fo, LAljlnch "cdvity. 
... i.,lon essentfal: r. N.,..ErMntf.1 (" ...-0" EaHntI,l (" Ops PI50nnll I. If your loc .'tion .nd Inyolvlmut I, IdlntJul fo, l.udi"9 .nd Innch. check the 
l.8catfon: Co' KSClCCMS (" Nol oIlCSClCCAFS · Use the S.ml lnfonn..uon u L.\lnch-
chttkboM. 
Faclllty:j I 2. Indlclte .h.dt.r vou ar. consld,r.d non-
Room: I .. .. "ti.L minion .... na.1 or oper.tion.t 
petronnel. For dlfinitions of UtI'. cholet • 
... the Olullry. If you havi .. ny que.tlon 
r ••• rdlng your du.tflcltlon. cont.ct your 
Juptrvlsor. 
3 . S.I,c'\ your F .. cllity by typing fnt;t the 
F.clllty fi.ld. A lin of poulbl, much .. " • 
• how" u you type In dI. fl.ld. 
4. Stilet your Room by typing Into the Room 
fi.ld . A list of pouibl, mltCh ... r. shown 
u you type In the fl. ld . 
5. Click toNTlNUf to proeud to the ntNt 
1+ Go Badt II~ Submit I 
.ttp In the Wlurd. 
II Done rrrl'!l lOCllIrtr- ,4 
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The final screen lets you know if you completed entering your information appropriately 
and allows you to migrate to others areas of the system. 
-
~ S~"'11 Ldunth A(tlVlt y WILdrd ~(rOsort In~e~et Explorer provided by J80~C c 
ISSMT , . '\" 
~ ... ~ . .... ~ .. r 0; ... ~-= .. t~ .. 1 . .. .., .. . l ~I 
~~~~-------- --
L.uftch A(bv.tv <..upp •• t "hurd (~Of c,. 0) U .... I "Ilt.41,,1 H. lnll l k 
~------------ --------- - -- ------- -
~ . 1 N ttvorL 514,, -1,. ./ Sup 2: Ver,fy P .. rlon . l lnf~ ~ !. .. 3 : Add L~unch A(tIvK' ../ C;Y: P 4 Add l.ndln9 ActJytt, 
~ Lllunch ActiYity Wizllrd Completed Successfully I' ...... More Infonnation 
1-
The Launch IIctlvlty Wizard .as completed successfully. Thank For mo .. Inf.nnatJon II~Out KSC', SoH 
you for takonQ the time to enter your launch activities . Serv jc. "'an'9tmtntTooL vl .h:~
You will recieve an email from SSMT confirmlOQ any chanQes to your SSMT provld •• bot!! man.,.ment of 
personnel information. If the informabon IS correct in the ema,l, you p.rsonl'le' d.tl and surch c.p.-blhtles lor 
may simply 'Qnore it . lout KSC and NASA willi, employ .... 
Where Do You Want to Go? If VlOU have any q".sdonJ .r comments r'9ud1n9 SSMT, pi .... contact 
If you would like to worle with anJ other launch actiVities, please dick 
SSMTfudback 
h!rl to return to the Launch Activity WIZard start page . 
OtherwISe, dick the CLOSE button to dose this Window and end your 
Launch Acbvlty WIZard SesSion . 
I ~ CLOSE I 
~---- rrr~Locallrtr- A 
The Importance of Self-Service Management Tool Data 
Along with the type of launch vehicle, Range Safety analysts use this information about 
personnel and other numerous parameters, such as winds, building structures, and 
failure rates, to determine risk estimates. 
It is critical that Kennedy Space Center personnel update their information in the Self-
Service Management Tool database at least quarterly to ensure day-to-day information 
is correct. Personnel should also update the information for each launch and landing 
event for Shuttle and expendable launch vehicle activities on Cape Canaveral Air Force 
Station. Kennedy Space Center Range Safety ensures up-to-date launch and landing 
manifest selections are available in the Self-Service Management Tool program. 
The continued use of the Self-Service Management Tool program greatly enhances the 
protection of Kennedy Space Center's most valued resource-its people. 
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Support of Toxies and Distant Foeus Overpressure Evaluations 
TacSat-2: Kennedy Space Center Range Safety Support of Toxics and Distant 
Focus Overpressure Evaluations 
TacSat-2, a small technology mission sponsored by the Air Force Research Laboratory, 
was launched aboard an Orbital Minotaur 1 vehicle from the Wallops Flight Facility in 
December 2006. The Orbital Suborbital Program Minotaur 1 launch vehicle consisted of 
an M-55 (51 ,514 pounds) and SR-19 (13,740 pounds) first and second stage taken from 
the Minuteman-2 as shown in the picture below. Upper stages consisted of an Orion 
50XL motor and Orion-38 motor, both of Pegasus heritage. 
,,-.,.- ____ ---7.9.75 
'lAiiiil-----580.85 
·,,--..,IIf-----49U5 
f----- ).40.52 
f----- 289.50 
----274.43 
Although launch vehicles of 
Significant size have been launched 
from Wallops Flight Facility in the 
past, this is the first time Wallops has 
performed a detailed analysis of toxic 
and overpressure hazards. A Tier 1, 
or screening evaluation, of the 
TacSat-2 mission performed by the 
45th Space Wing revealed an in-
depth toxics and distant focusing 
overpressure analysis was required. 
The close proximity of the Minotaur 1 
launch vehicle (over 65,000 pounds 
of solid rocket propellant) to the off-
base public drove the need for more 
detailed analysis. Based on the data 
requirements, first time evaluation of 
these hazards required a Significant 
effort. The TacSat-2 mission was 
required to meet the acceptable risk 
criteria contained in NASA 
Procedural Requirement 8715.5, 
Range Safety Program. 
Kennedy Space Center Range 
Safety volunteered to assist Wallops 
in evaluating the public and 
workforce risk due to toxics and 
distant focusing overpressure 
resulting from the TacSat-2 mission. 
Kennedy Space Center Range Safety has gained a Significant amount of experience in 
evaluating these hazards at the Eastern Range and has assisted Wallops in the 
development, coordination, and real-time support of toxic and distant focusing 
overpressure risk evaluations. The 45th Space Wing and ACTA Inc provided significant 
support to this effort. 
Kennedy Space Center Range Safety assumed the lead on coordinating contractor and 
45th Space Wing support, tracking task progress, leading technical discussions, and 
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facilitating weekly telecons. Development of off-base and on-base population databases, 
terrain and structural databases, yield histograms, and historical meteorological files 
required to support a Wallops Flight Facility hazard analysis were completed. 
Kennedy Space Center Range Safety also completed a distant focusing overpressure 
availability study and coordinated with the 45th Space Wing and ACTA to complete a 
toxics availability study. These availability studies aided the assessment team in 
determining the need for additional development of input assumptions and allowed 
decision makers to gain an understanding of the probability of potential launch holds. 
Launch day operations support by Kennedy Space Center Range Safety consisted of 
running and reporting real-time distant focusing overpressure risk, coordinating with the 
45th Space Wing to provide real-time toxic modeling support, and coordinating with 
ACTA to provide meteorological and technical support. On 16 December at 0700, 
TacSat-2 was successfully launched from the Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport on the 
southern tip of the Wallops Flight Facility with no concerns with respect to toxic or distant 
focusing overpressure risk mostly due to north westerly winds. 
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Emerging Technology 
Space-Based Telemetry And Range Safety 2006 
Space-based range demonstration and certification, formerly called space-based 
telemetry and range safety (STARS), is a multicenter NASA proof-of-concept project to 
determine if space-based communications can support Range Safety functions (tracking 
data and flight termination signals) while also providing broadband Range User data 
(voice, video, and vehicle/payload data). 
Space-based range demonstration and certification is made up of the Range Safety and 
the Range User systems. The Range Safety system sends tracking data from the 
vehicle to the ground and receives flight termination commands from the ground. The 
Range User system sends high-data-rate vehicle telemetry from the vehicle to the 
ground. Both systems use NASA's Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System. 
Rocket Space-Based Range Demonstration and Certification System Test 
A successful test of the Range Safety system was held at Wallops Flight Facility on 
December 20,2005 on a two-stage, Terrier-Orion, spin-stabilized sounding rocket. A 
diagram of the rocket is shown below. A photograph of the launch is on the next page. 
The first-stage Terrier MK 70 booster was 18 inches in diameter, 155 inches long, and 
weighed 2177 pounds before ignition. The second stage Improved-Orion sustainer was 
14 inches in diameter, 105 inches long, and weighed 965 pounds before ignition. The 
recoverable payload section was 165 inches long and weighed 526 pounds. 
STARS Transmitter 
40W @ 2287 5MHz Clamp Release 
Recovery Section Payload Separation 
Pacific ScientifidQuanticIHoIex 
6200 Pressure Cartridges !Q!y.2} 
Improved Orion Initiator 
Terrier Rocket Motor 
NEW = 1,1271bs 
During the sounding rocket launch and flight, the space-based range demonstration and 
certification Range Safety system generally behaved very well on the highly dynamic, 
rapidly spinning (-5 hertz) sounding rocket, receiving data from the GPS constellation 
and maintaining links with two Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System satellites 
simultaneously during the entire 10 minute flight. 
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The payload section deployed a parachute and 
landed in the Atlantic Ocean about 90 miles 
downrange from the launch site. Its maximum 
altitude was about 115 miles, and its maximum 
speed was in excess of Mach 5. The 
acceleration just after lift-off was about 20 g's. 
More than 99 percent of all forward commands 
were successfully received and processed, and 
more than 95 percent of all return frames were 
successfully received and processed at the 
control center at Wallops Flight Facility. 
The latency for a single command to travel over 
land lines to White Sands Complex and then to 
the vehicle via a tracking and relay data 
satellite, and to be processed onboard and 
received back at the control center at Wallops 
Flight Facility-again via tracking and relay 
data satellite and land lines-was between 1.0 
and 1.1 seconds, which should meet the Range 
Safety requirements. The forward link margins 
for Tracking and Relay Satellite-1 0 
(designated TOE and located at 41 ° W Longitude) were between 11 -12 ± 2 dB and 
between 9-10 dB ± 1.5 dB for Tracking and Relay Satellite-4 (deSignated TOS and 
located at 46° W Longitude). The Range Safety system hardware was recovered dry, but 
one of the antennas was damaged while the payload was being recovered at sea. 
The attached video shows the launch, re-entry, and recovery of the rocket. 
F15 Space-Based Range Demonstration and Certification System Tests 
A set of test flights on an F15 at Dryden Flight Research Center is currently underway. 
The primary goal for the Range User is to test a Ku-band, phased-array antenna with a 
data rate of 5 megabytes per second. The antenna is electronically steerable in elevation 
and mechanically steerable in azimuth and is mounted on top of the F15 behind the 
cockpit. Preliminary analysis indicates that the system performed well and additional 
analysis is underway. 
The Range Safety system will test the ability to maintain lock with two Tracking and Data 
Relay Satellite System satellites simultaneously on a highly dynamic aircraft Simulating 
an out-of-control launch vehicle and hand-off between the launch head and the Tracking 
and Data Relay Satellite System. Additional measurements will be made of the link 
margin and data latency. 
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Autonomous Flight Safety System - Phase III 
The autonomous flight safety system is a joint Kennedy Space Center and Wallops 
Flight Facility project currently in its third phase of development. The autonomous flight 
safety system is an independent and autonomous flight termination subsystem intended 
for expendable launch vehicles. It uses tracking and attitude data from an onboard GPS 
and inertial measurement unit sensors and configurable rule-based algorithms to make 
flight termination decisions. 
The objectives of the autonomous flight safety system are as follows: 
• Increase capabilities by allowing launches from locations that do not have existing 
range safety infrastructure 
• Reduce costs by eliminating some downrange tracking and communications assets 
• Increase safety by reducing the reaction time for flight termination decisions 
Sounding Rocket Flight Test 
The autonomous flight 
safety system flew on the 
Terrier Improved-Orion, 
two-stage sounding rocket 
shown at the right at White 
Sands Missile Range on 
April 5, 2006. A single-
chassis, dual-processor, 
dual-GPS system was 
used. 
The primary purpose of this 
flight was to demonstrate 
the key elements of the 
autonomous flight safety 
system concept of 
operations pertaining to 
pre-launch set-up (loading 
and verifying the 
application and 
configuration files), bench 
testing, vehicle integration, 
in-vehicle end-to-end 
testing, count-down system 
verification procedures, 
and flight operations. A 
secondary purpose was to 
gather lessons learned 
which could be codified 
into the Autonomous Flight 
Safety System System 
Level Requirements 
document currently under 
revision. 
60 
The test incorporated redundant GPS sensors and used two independently programmed 
processors. One was loaded with a nominal trajectory and the other programmed with 
artificial rules under which the nominal flight would violate safety parameters and 
provoke termination commands. The autonomous flight safety system was not 
connected to actual explosives. The system functioned and reacted correctly during the 
entire flight from launch to parachute deployment. 
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SpaceX Falcon 1 Orbital Flight at Kwajalein Reagan Test Site 
The autonomous flight safety system was 
scheduled to fly on the next SpaceX 
Falcon I launch in January 2007 from the 
Reagan Test Site at Kwajalein. The 
Falcon I, shown at right, is a two-stage, 
liquid oxygen and rocket grade kerosene 
powered launch vehicle designed to 
achieve substantial improvements in 
reliability and cost and to deliver 480 
kilograms (1058 pounds) to an orbit of 200 
kilometers at 28.5° inclination. The first 
stage is almost entirely reusable and 
returns via parachute to a water landing. 
Lift-off weight for the standard Falcon I is 
approximately 27,000 kilograms (60,000 
pounds), length is about 22 meters (70 
feet) and diameter is 1.67 meters (5.5 
feet). 
The autonomous flight safety system will 
interface with the low cost TDRSS 
transmitter to demonstrate space-based 
range concepts. The low cost TDRSS 
transmitter will transmit autonomous flight 
safety system GPS metric tracking and 
flight termination data to NASA's Tracking 
Data and Relay Satellite System. The 
Tracking Data and Relay Satellite System 
will relay the autonomous flight safety 
system data to White Sands Missile 
Range where it can then be transmitted to 
Wallops Flight Facility, Kennedy Space 
Center, and Kwajalein for analysis. 
The primary objectives for the autonomous flight safety system during this launch 
opportunity are: 
• To test as many elements of the Autonomous Flight Safety System Concept of 
Operations as feasible within a true expendable launch vehicle integration and 
launch operations environment 
• To gain expendable launch vehicle test, integration, countdown, and flight 
experience time on specific autonomous flight safety system hardware configuration, 
including the first flight test of the command logic switching and interlock circuit board 
• To gain expendable launch vehicle test, integration, countdown, and flight 
experience time on specific autonomous flight safety system software configuration 
items, including the configurable flight algorithm mission rule constructs, cross-
sensor qualification algorithms, staging event detection algorithms, and the 
command logic switching and interlock circuit board voting firmware 
The autonomous flight safety system hardware will be part of the payload and will not be 
recovered. 
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Enhanced Flight Termination System Program 
The objective of the enhanced flight termination system program is to develop the next 
generation flight termination system for the Department of Defense and NASA ranges. 
The program addresses robust command links for flight termination, including message 
formats, modulation methods, and encryption. 
Previous Status 
The Range Safety Group of the Range Commanders Council initiated a study task and 
ultimately selected continuous phase frequency shift keying as the modulation scheme, 
a 64-bit triple data encryption standard for security, and the layout of the 64-bit message 
for the new system. The Air Force Flight Test Center then let a contract to build 
prototype enhanced flight termination receiver decoders and an encoder for the ground 
transmitter. The receiver decoder and encoder units successfully demonstrated that the 
enhanced flight termination system would function in flight and in an operational setting. 
The Central Test and Evaluation Investment Program is funding the development of the 
flight termination receiver decoders, encoders, monitors, and encryption units for 
different range applications, such as uninhabited aerial vehicles, space launch vehicles, 
and missiles. In August 2004, two contracts to develop the enhanced flight termination 
receiver decoder engineering development units were awarded to L-3 Cincinnati 
Electronics and Herley Industries. In August 2005, a contract to develop the ground 
systems (enhanced flight termination system encoder, monitor, and encryption unit) was 
awarded to L-3 Cincinnati Electronics. 
Current Accomplishments 
Milestones accomplished this year are described below. 
• In September and November 2005 and February 2006, system, preliminary, and 
critical design reviews on the development of the ground systems were held with L-3 
Cincinnati Electronics. 
• In February 2006, L-3 Cincinnati Electronics successfully held a test readiness 
review to initiate the qualification and acceptance testing of the flight termination 
receiver decoder. Qualification testing is expected to be completed in November 
2006. 
• In early August 2006, three of the units successfully passed acceptance testing at L-
3 Cincinnati Electronics. 
• In late August 2006, the ground systems (encoder, monitor, encryption unit) were 
successfully tested at L-3 Cincinnati Electronics and delivered to the Air Force Flight 
Test Center. 
Future Plans 
The enhanced flight termination system program plans to test the operational hardware 
on an advanced mid-range air-to-air missile at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida in early 
2007 using a qualified flight termination receiver and the ground equipment currently 
under development. This will be the first of several flight tests in 2007 involving the new 
enhanced flight termination system components. 
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The final phase of the program provides the mechanism to field ground systems for 
production and deployment on all Department of Defense and NASA ranges. This part of 
the program is expected to begin in the 2007 timeframe. 
Enhanced Flight Termination System Architecture 
The enhanced flight termination system architecture consists of the vehicle and ground 
systems shown in the diagram below. The enhanced flight termination system was 
designed so that upon the completion and qualification of all units for both airborne and 
ground systems, implementation with existing architecture would minimally impact the 
ranges. 
Vehicle System 
Ground System 
EDcoder 
---------, 
Tnple DaI. : 
EDc!ypIJon : 
StududUmt : 
EDcoder 
TnpIe DaIa : 
~Il: 
StududUIIlI : 
MODer 
r-----------
: Tuple DaI. 
, EDc!ypIJon 
: St8lldan:l UNI 
On the airborne side, the enhanced flight termination system uses existing components 
and systems, where the only new addition would be the new enhanced flight termination 
system command receiver/decoder. Legacy antennas, couplers, logic units, safety 
devices, and ordnance will be used along with the new command receiver/decoders and 
ground equipment. 
The ground systems architecture will change somewhat, but the impacts will not be 
severe. Ranges will have to purchase the new enhanced flight termination system 
ground equipment (encoders, monitors, and triple data encryption units) and each range 
can develop the unencrypted 64-bit enhanced flight termination system command frame 
(command controller) based on its own culture. The ground system will also implement 
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existing technology and equipment including Range Safety Officer command panels, 
modulators/exciters, high power amplifiers, and command transmitters. 
Enhanced Flight Termination System Equipment 
Four of the major components of the enhanced flight termination system~nhanced 
flight termination receiver, triple data encryption unit, encoder, and monitor-are 
described below. 
Enhanced Flight Termination Receiver 
The receiver takes the encrypted 
messages sent from the command 
transmitter system (modulator, exciter, 
power amplifier) and decrypts them into 
useable commands. 
Triple Data Encryption Unit 
Encoder 
The encoder takes the encrypted 
message from the triple data encryption 
unit and adds a certain amount of frame 
synchronization and parity bits for 
forward error correction before sending 
the final message to the Legacy 
exciters. 
The triple data encryption unit is 
embedded within the encoders and 
encrypts the messages using the Triple 
Data Encryption Standard. A triple data 
encryption unit is embedded within each 
monitor for decryption of the enhanced 
flight termination system message for 
analysis. 
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Monitor 
The monitor is used as an analysis tool 
for Range Safety by providing an 
independent verification process for the 
transmitted enhanced flight termination 
system signal. The command 
transmitter system sends the final, 
encrypted enhanced flight termination 
system message to the receiver and to 
the monitor. 
After 2006, the enhanced flight termination system program is one step closer to 
bringing a new, qualified, improved system to ranges and range users. As this program 
nears completion of qualification testing on all components involved, Range Safety has 
set its sights toward the operational and flight testing that will take place throughout 
2007. 
Multiple milestones have to be met as the program continues to get closer to bringing a 
new system currently under development into operational status. Range Safety will 
continue to work with the enhanced flight termination system program and support the 
mission of providing a new advanced method of flight termination that will be low cost 
and low impact to ranges and range users, while providing a reliable system that will 
help ensure public safety during launch operations. 
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Joint Advanced Range Safety System 
The joint advanced range safety system is a collaborative effort between Dryden Flight 
Research Center and the Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards Air Force Base. The 
effort is to develop a state-of-the-art mission planning, risk analysis, and risk 
management tool for Range Safety. The Range Safety organizations from all Major 
Range and Test Facility Bases are being asked to support the development, testing, and 
operation of uninhabited aerial vehicles and reusable launch vehicles. It is the vision of 
joint advanced range safety system to provide range safety support for these missions. 
Primary System Elements 
The joint advanced range safety system consists of two primary elements: a mission 
analysis software tool and the real-time operations tool. The mission analysis software 
tool will quantify the range safety risk for a given flight path and its associated vehicle 
parameters using a computerized method. This method will streamline the range safety 
analysis process by providing a consistent, high fidelity solution in less time than 
required by present methods of analysis. 
Additionally, the real-time operations tool will provide the Range Safety Officer with near 
real-time assessment of the range safety risks during flight. This capability has many 
possible applications for the uninhabited aerial vehicle or reusable launch vehicle 
operator, including the following: 
• Assessment of uninhabited aerial vehicles overflight of populated areas 
• Allowing extended flight of an anomalous vehicle 
• Recovery of an off-nominal vehicle at an alternate landing site 
• Selection of an alternate flight or entry path 
Status 
The joint advanced range safety system mission analysis software tool is nearing 
operational status and is expected to be available for government use in 2007. The 
mission analysis software tool is undergoing an independent software assurance 
assessment from NASA's Independent Verification and Validation Facility in West 
Virginia. Work on the joint advanced range safety system real-time operations tool has 
not begun due to lack of funding. 
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Joint Advanced Range Safety System Team 
The Joint Advanced Range Safety System Team would like to welcome two new 
members, the United States Air Force's 30th and 45th Space Wings. The Eastern and 
Western Launch Ranges have contributed to the development of joint advanced range 
safety system modules that focus on the Range Safety analysis of space launch 
vehicles. Welcome aboard. 
The Joint Advanced Range Safety System Team would also like to recognize the 
contributions of Johnson Space Center, Kennedy Space Center, and Wallops Flight 
Facility for providing valuable input during their initial evaluation of the tool's capabilities. 
68 
Eastern Range Instrumentation Update 
The Eastern Range is the launch head at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, which also 
supports Kennedy Space Center launches. Range Management activities are hosted at 
Patrick Air Force Base under the command of the 45th Space Wing. Downrange sites 
include Jonathan Dickinson Missile Tracking Annex and Antigua, Argentia, and 
Ascension stations. In the context of space launch operations, the Eastern Range 
includes all of the surrounding air, sea, and land space that is within the range of any 
particular launch vehicle. The Eastern Range is not part of NASA but supports NASA 
activities. 
Primary Objective of the Eastern Range 
The primary objective of the Eastern Range is to provide for the safety of the public 
during launch operations. The activities and resources to ensure safety of flight include 
range instrumentation, infrastructure, and scheduling required to support and ensure that 
space and ballistic launches and other operations are appropriately supported. 
The Eastern Range Range Safety 
Program uses instrumentation that is 
comprised of legacy and state-of-the-art 
technologies to ensure launch mission 
safety, launch area safety, and launch 
complex safety. Range instrumentation 
is primarily at the Florida locations of 
Cape Canaveral Air Force Station 
(missile row shown in the picture at 
right) and Patrick Air Force Base. The 
Eastern Range also uses 
instrumentation from other Department 
of Defense and NASA agencies to 
accomplish its mission. 
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Information Provided by Instrumentation 
Range Safety Strings 
During launch operations, Eastern Range 
instrumentation provides vehicle positioning 
information from radar, vehicle telemetry, 
and optic tracking systems. Additionally, 
telemetry also provides vehicle health and 
status through its data stream. This range 
safety critical data is shipped via the range 
communication CORE network to the range 
safety display strings located in the Range 
Operations Control Center at Cape 
Canaveral Air Station. The Range 
Operations Control Center is shown to the 
left. 
The current range safety strings (the equipment that data flows through) are designated 
as Flight Operations Version One (FOV1) and located at the Range Operations Control 
Center. The FOV1 system provides an Eastern Range range safety function and 
monitors launch vehicle performance. FOV1 consists of two independent systems: 
FOV1-A and FOV1-B. The systems acquire and process instrumentation data from the 
Eastern Range, NASA, and off-range sites through redundant network paths. Using the 
instrumentation data, these systems generate flight path and predicted impact point 
displays similar to the one shown below. 
Using these displays, the 
Mission Flight Control 
Officer determines the 
risk based on pre-defined 
mission rules and , if 
required, destroys any 
vehicle that violates 
those rules. The 45th 
Space Wing Safety Office 
personnel devise these 
mission rules to ensure 
public safety from any 
errant launch vehicle 
incident. This is the 
primary Eastern Range 
function. 
FOV1 is constantly going 
through upgrade and 
development efforts. The 
current follow-on 
development effort is 
ongoing and is expected 
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to be completed in early 
2007. 
Post-Detect Telemetry System 
The premier Eastern Range launch vehicle telemetry acquisition system is the post-
detect telemetry system. This system provides transport of digital post-detect telemetry 
data from Eastern Range telemetry sites via the Network CORE System Wide Area 
Network Interface Units and the microwave and commercial circuits from Jonathan 
Dickinson Missile Tracking Annex. 
Post-detect telemetry system 
sites include Tel-4 at Kennedy 
Space Center (shown at left), 
Jonathan Dickinson Missile 
Tracking Annex, Antigua, and 
Ascension. The post-detect 
telemetry data is transported 
to the launch customer 
facilities and the Range 
Operations Control Center 
(FOV1) for range safety 
purposes. 
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In 2006, the developer updated post-detect telemetry system software to Version 3.1 to 
provide resolution of deficiency reports generated before post-detect telemetry system 
initial acceptance. 
INTEL SA TCOM 
The INTELSAT SATCOM System now consists of two 
separate SATCOM strings: A Side and B Side. SATCOM 
A, the second phase of the post-detect telemetry system 
project, was modified in 2006 and implemented at the 
Eastern Range with the post-detect telemetry system 
bandwidth, polarization, and modulation format. This new 
digital communication transport service is the Eastern 
Range secondary telemetry and transport management 
system circuit transport carrier from the downrange stations 
of Antigua and Ascension to the Range Operations Control 
Center. The control center antenna is shown to the right. 
Wide Area Network Interface Units System 
The Network CORE Wide Area Network Interface Units system is the major transport 
mechanism to Range Safety and telemetry data end users. The CORE provides the 
communication backbone at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. The CORE consists of 
four rings, two OC-48 (red 2488 megabits per second) and two OC-12 (green 622 
megabits per second). The communication link to NASA is through the Launch Control 
Center. The primary nodes are the Range Operations Control Center, XY Facility, 
Southwest Terminal Building , and the East Terminal Building. 
Central Telemetry Processing System 
The Central Telemetry Processing System is used for the processing, distribution, and 
display of Range Safety telemetry data during the powered flight portion of Eastern 
Range launches. Post-detect data streams into the Central Telemetry Processing 
System where it undergoes frame synchronization and decommutation. The resulting 
telemetry parameters are used to generate 4.8 kilobits per second range safety outputs. 
This 4.8 kilobits per second data is forwarded to the FOV1 system for further processing 
and display. 
Replacing the Cyber 860 Mainframe Computers 
Many pre- and post-launch analysis products are produced at the Cape Central 
Computer Complex. For over 20 years, the Eastern Range has depended on Cyber 860 
mainframe computers at the Central Computer Complex to produce launch critical 
instrumentation analysis and Range Safety flight analysis. These computers and the 
code that resides in them are outdated in that the hardware is very costly to maintain 
and software problems are too difficult to fix. Two projects are in progress to replace the 
860 Cyber mainframe computers. 
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Launch Analysis Production System. The Launch Analysis Production System project 
is slated to replace Cyber 860 instrumentation analysis. The project is translating 
instrumentation analysis computer programs originally written in CDC Cyber FORTRAN 
to C++ programs that can be hosted on a standard personal computer with a Windows 
operating system. The project started in April 2005 and is presently scheduled to have 
the instrumentation analysis programs functioning by mid-2008. Most of the Launch Area 
Production System hardware has been installed and initial testing is underway. 
Safety Hazards Analysis and Risk Processing. The Safety Hazards Analysis and Risk 
Processing project is slated to replace Cyber 860 flight analysis automation. The project 
is re-hosting the CDC Cyber FORTRAN flight analysis programs primarily using 
MATLAB. This system will have open system architecture to allow incorporation of 
innovations in processor speed and storage capacity without major redevelopment. New 
commercial off-the-shelf software can be incorporated as "add-on" tools. The 
architecture will also accommodate the latest built-in analytical tools. 
Safety Hazards Analysis and Risk Processing is a two-phased project. Phase 1 will 
provide the host computer, backup storage, version control tools, and an initial suite of 
flight analysis software modules. Phase 1 software modules will enable flight analysts to 
process range user and weather data to produce range safety display backgrounds and 
range safety risk-based products for launch day support. 
Successful completion of Phase 1 will eliminate 45th Space Wing reliance on the Cyber 
860 mainframes to produce flight analysis launch support products. Phase 1 is on 
schedule to be completed by October 2007. Phase 2 will provide flight analysis 
enhancements that were not previously possible due to Cyber 860 limitations and 
organic software maintenance capability. 
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Automated Range Surveillance using Radio Interferometry 
As NASA's primary launch operations center, Kennedy Space Center is very interested 
in new technologies that will lower Range Safety's operations and maintenance costs 
while increasing reliability. Kennedy Space Center's Advanced Systems Division has 
taken advantage of NASA's Small Business Innovation Research program to help 
develop advanced Range Safety technologies by successfully obtaining awards for 
contracts and managing the Small Business Innovation Research subtopic that solicits 
technologies for automated collection and transfer of range surveillance and intrusion 
data. 
Range surveillance is a primary focus of launch range safety and often a cost and 
schedule driver. Because of the difficulty of verifying a cleared range, launch delays are 
common and will increase as spaceports are developed in new areas. To address this 
issue, a 2005 Small Business Innovation Research Phase I contract was awarded to 
Soneticom, Inc. to develop a system for automated range surveillance using radio 
interferometry. 
Proposed Automated System 
The proposed automated range surveillance system will use a small network of remote 
sensors to perform radio interferometry and time difference of arrival techniques to 
survey, identify, and locate radio frequency energy signatures within a given geographic 
area such as Kennedy Space Center's launch area. The survey mission will use radio 
interferometry techniques to create radio frequency "images" of the surveyed area. 
These images will show the locations of all radio frequency activity within an area. The 
intent is to capture and average a set of images to establish the nominal radio frequency 
baseline for the area. 
Once a baseline is established, real-time radio frequency surveys will be instantly 
compared to the nominal baseline to detect the existence of radio frequency spectral 
anomalies. In addition to identifying these anomalies, the time difference of arrival and 
radio interferometry techniques provide the capability to determine precise locations of 
radio frequency activities. Therefore, Range Safety can quickly and cost effectively 
locate the spectral anomaly source and initiate steps to mitigate the source without 
delay. 
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Phase I Efforts 
During the Phase I efforts of 
the contract, the contractor's 
system, which is 
permanently located in the 
Melbourne area and covers 
15 square miles, was able to 
locate the radio frequency 
activity to within less than 
100 meters. The figure 
shows a typical network of 
seven remote sensors 
yielding optimum range 
coverage with economy of 
hardware. A standard 
Ethernet link allows the base 
station used for monitoring 
the sensor system to be 
remotely located. 
Capabilities of the System 
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The capabilities that the automated range surveillance using radio interferometry and 
time difference of arrival location techniques provide are listed below: 
• Facilitate the expedient clearing of ranges by identifying and pinpointing sources of 
suspicious radio frequency energy emissions 
• Increase Range Safety's ability to preemptively identify and locate potential range 
intrusions 
• Reduce the vulnerability of operations to emission interference whether due to 
inadvertent or hostile acts, by identifying and locating sources of potential threats 
• Allow an area to be remotely monitored in real-time from thousands of miles away 
• Lower costs in the overall process of insuring clear and safe range and other 
restricted area operations 
Currently, no commercial systems that offer all of the capabilities described above are 
available. This system will dramatically decrease the time and expense associated with 
clearing the range while simultaneously increasing safety by identifying and locating 
threats from interference, whether unintentional or hostile in nature. 
Soneticom successfully met all the objectives for its 2005 Small Business Innovation 
Research Phase I contract. The Phase I efforts proved that radio interferometry, 
normally used for high-resolution imaging of celestial sources, could be used for 
terrestrial applications. With the success of Phase I, Soneticom submitted a Phase II 
proposal that would enhance the system's accuracy and decrease the data processing 
time so a viable system could be built for the commercial industry. Soneticom's Phase II 
proposal was selected with the contract currently being negotiated and contract award 
expected in December 2006_ 
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Automated Optical Tracking 
and Three-Dimensional Object Recognition 
Most launch accidents happen shortly after lift-off when the vehicle is still within a few 
tens of kilometers from the launch pad. In this region, an optical system for tracking and 
identifying debris may be more versatile and less costly than conventional radars. A 
Phase II Small Business Innovation Research contract has been awarded to OPTRA, 
Inc. to develop techniques to track and construct three-dimensional views of tumbling 
objects in the atmosphere or space using digital optical tracking images for a variety of 
missions. These views will be used to determine the approximate geometric sizes and 
shapes of the objects. 
Potential Application 
The potential application is to help track and identify debris quickly after an accident or 
flight ano'maly as shown in the diagram below. The data will be provided by sequential 
digital images from one or more tracking cameras, ideally operating autonomously. The 
goal is to track and identify between 50 to 100 objects with typical cross-sections varying 
from tens of square meters down to one square meter or less within several minutes 
after an accident. 
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Phase I Investigation 
During the initial Phase I investigation that ended in 2006, OPTRA developed object 
detection, tracking, and identification algorithms and successfully tested these 
algorithms on computer-generated objects of various shapes and sizes and on sample 
real-world image sequences of a Delta II booster separation. OPTRA also determined 
the minimum size that can be imaged using current technology, the probability of 
correctly estimating an object's size and shape using identifier qualifiers for each shape 
class, the resolution capability for accurate identification, and quantified the processing 
speed and the means for transmitting analyzed data to the command center. 
Phase II Goals 
The goals of the Phase II effort include the following: 
• Refining the detection, tracking, and identification algorithms 
• Developing a robust optical system using commercial off-the-shelf equipment 
• Investigating the affects of noise, obscurations, viewing angle, tracking errors on the 
identification probabilities 
• Field testing of the system and algorithms by tracking and identifying recreational 
parachutists 
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Processor for Real-Time Atmospheric Compensation in 
Long-Range Imaging 
Range surveillance and launch tracking are critical components of space exploration 
because of their impact on safety, cost, and the overall mission timeline. Because of the 
difficulty of verifying a cleared range, launch delays are common and will increase as 
spaceports are developed in new areas. To expedite range clearance and enhance 
vehicle tracking, it is vital to see accurately and clearly through the atmosphere. 
However, the quality of images taken with long-range optical systems is severely 
degraded by atmospheric movements in the path between the region under observation 
and the imaging system. In fact, as distances increase, atmospheric turbulence is often 
the dominating source of noise in infrared and visible imaging applications. 
Fortunately, image processing algorithms, such as the bi-spectrum speckle imaging 
method and control grid interpolation, have been developed to help compensate for 
these disturbances. Even so, these image processing algorithms by themselves are not 
enough. Specifically, atmospheric compensation algorithms are computationally 
intensive, which prevents even top-of-the-line personal computers from evaluating them 
in real time. The necessary algorithms can easily require several seconds to process a 
single frame and real-time video requires several dozen frames per second-a two 
order-of-magnitude difference! In 2005, a Phase I Small Business Innovation Research 
contract was awarded to EM Photonics, Inc. of Newark, Delaware to develop a 
processor for real-time atmospheric compensation in long-range imaging. 
Phase I Approach 
The technology being developed is an accelerated solver for a speckle imaging method 
developed by Carmen Carrano at Lawrence Livermore National Lab. The method takes 
several seconds of compute time on a modern personal computer to process one image 
frame. The Small Business Innovation Research approach is to reformulate the 
algorithm and implement it in hardware using a field programmable gate array as a 
reconfigurable computing device. 
Field programmable gate arrays on the market today contain millions of logic blocks. 
Algorithms implemented in software languages such as C can be compiled to a direct 
implementation in field programmable gate array hardware with orders of magnitude 
performance improvement. The speckle imaging computational problem can be broken 
up and solved by many parallel hardware blocks in the array and the individual results 
recombined to produce the resulting image. The overall objective is to be able to process 
high definition 720p 60 frames per second video in real-time. 
Phase I Results 
In Phase I of the Small Business Innovation Research contract, EM Photonics was able 
to verify the approach by reformulating the algorithm and partially implementing it on a 
field programmable gate array resulting in a 40X speed improvement over the software 
only version. Only a small piece of the solver was actually implemented on the array. 
The bulk of the work in Phase I was benchmarking and reconfiguring the code to lend 
itself to field programmable gate array implementation. EM Photonics successfully met 
all the objectives for its 2005 Small Business Innovation Research Phase I contract. 
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At the final demonstration, they were able to process 
(albeit at 1 frame per second due to the limited 
implementation) high-clefinition recorded launch video 
samples to prove the increase in speed and image 
enhancement capabilities. An excerpt from one of these 
samples is shown in the photograph of the Pluto New 
Horizons spacecraft. 
Phase II Goals 
With the success of Phase I, EM Photonics submitted a 
Phase II proposal. The goal for Phase II is to complete 
the implementation of the entire algorithm in the field 
programmable gate array and achieve the real-time 
objective. The company is proposing to deliver a desktop 
workstation (personal computer) solution using a co-
processing board developed for another product. The 
workstation could process video from a central control 
room type location either during or post launch working on 
recorded video. The company is also proposing to provide 
an integrated embedded solution suitable for attaching 
directly to an imaging system in the field. EM Photonics 
Phase II was selected for award with a contract expected 
in December 2006. 
Pluto New Horizons Imagery 
Speckle enhancement of the launch of the Pluto 
New Horizons spacecraft. This imagery was 
processed with the prototype solver developed in 
Phase I. 
Currently there are no commercial systems available that provide this type of image 
enhancement and compensation for atmospheric disturbance. EM Photonics has other 
field programmable gate array based hardware accelerated solver commercial products 
on the market and, if successful with Phase II, has several potential customers for this 
product. 
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GPS Metric Tracking For the ARES Launch Vehicles 
On December 21 , 2004, the President of the United States authorized a new national 
policy that established guidelines and implementation actions for United States space 
transportation programs and activities to ensure the nation's ability to maintain access to 
and use space for U.S. national and homeland security and for civil , scientific, and 
commercial purposes. That policy states: 
The Federal space launch bases and ranges are vital components of the U.S. space 
transportation infrastructure and are national assets upon which access to space 
depends for national security, civil, and commercial purposes. The Secretary of 
Defense and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
shall operate the Federal launch bases and ranges in a manner so as to 
accommodate users from all sectors and shall transfer these capabilities to a 
predominantly space-based range architecture to accommodate, among others, 
operationally responsive space launch systems and new users. 
As a logical first step toward a space-based range architecture, the United States Air 
Force Space Command will require the use of GPS metric tracking for all vehicles 
launched at the Eastern and Western ranges by January 1, 2011. This new requirement 
has been planned and discussed by the Air Force Space Command since December of 
1997 and was communicated to NASA again during the May 2006 meeting of the 
Department of Defense/NASA Space Partnership Council. 
The key driver for the change is to reduce life cycle costs associated with the launch 
ranges while enhancing range capabilities to support operationally responsive space 
missions by transitioning to a space-based approach. As can be seen in the slide 
presented during the Partnership Council meeting, one way of achieving the needed 
cost savings is to reduce the number of operational radars by relying on GPS metric 
tracking data from the launch vehicles to provide one source of the required surveillance 
information. 
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Notional liTo Be" 
Radar Architecture 
The GPS metric tracking requirement was formally communicated to NASA via a policy 
memorandum from Dr. Ronald M. Saga, Under Secretary of the Air Force. The memo 
states: "In order to comply with national space transportation policy on space-based 
launch ranges, AFSPC will require the use of GPS metric tracking for all vehicles 
launched at the Eastern and Western ranges by January 1, 2011 ." 
The GPS metric tracking requirement was accepted on behalf of the Agency by Michael 
F. O'Brien, Assistant Administrator for External Relations, in a September 8, 2006 
memorandum to Dr. Sega. The memo states: 
"As the Administrator mentioned at the May 25, 2006, Partnership Council, NASA 
believes that your approach takes us in the right direction. As we define the 
implementation approach for GPS metric tracking, NASA plans to include GPS 
metric tracking capability as a part of the launch vehicle acquisition process for 
vehicles that will launch after 2010, with the understanding that the Air Force will 
make GPS metric tracking a standard part of the range infrastructure with which 
those NASA vehicles will interface. n 
Therefore, the Constellation Program's ARES launch vehicles will use GPS metric 
tracking for ascent flight operations. 
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Low Cost TDRSS Transceiver 
The Low Cost Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) Transceiver (LCT2) 
project is developing a cost-effective flight transceiver geared toward suborbital and 
launch vehicle applications. The Suborbital and Special Orbital Projects at Goddard 
Space Flight Center's Wallops Flight Facility initiated the effort. The reason for the 
development arose from a need for affordable flight hardware for smaller, lower cost 
missions that could realize operational savings by using the NASA Space Network to 
supplement or replace ground-based assets. Cost savings have been achieved by 
integrating the digital and analog circuits, implementing the modulator and demodulator 
digitally, and not requiring the level of parts selection and radiation tolerance needed for 
on orbit spacecraft. 
Initial Development Phase 
The transceiver development has 
been broken into several design 
phases. The initial phase covered 
development of a unit with S-Band 
transmit capability only, with 10 to 
20 watts of radio frequency output 
power in the 2200 to 2300 
megahertz band. The objectives of 
this first phase were to validate 
that the overall transceiver 
enclosure configuration, power 
distribution, printed circuit board 
mounting, and signal isolation met 
flight level environmental 
constraints. This phase was 
completed in April 2006. 
The phase one transmitter design incorporates a Xilinx Virtex-II field programmable gate 
array for digital intermediate frequency signal synthesis and baseband data filtering for 
an optional direct radio frequency quadrature modulator integrated circuit. The unit has 
demonstrated radio frequency compatibility with the Space Network in both spread and 
non-spread modes. One unit has flown on an Air Force expendable launch vehicle to 
support an over-the-horizon telemetry link. Two additional units have been integrated 
into payloads (not yet launched) for launch and early orbit telemetry support through the 
Space Network. 
Second Development Phase 
The second development phase, which is in progress, covers development of the 
receiver module for processing the TDRSS forward link at 2106.4 megahertz. A radio 
frequency front end and intermediate frequency gain stage are being incorporated into 
the present enclosure configuration. The intermediate frequency will be digitized and the 
correlator and modulator will be implemented digitally in a Virtex-4 field programmable 
gate array. 
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A prototype is planned to be available for testing in the summer of 2007. The new 
transceiver board that includes the receiver functionality will also contain the hooks to 
interface to a command and telemetry processor-being developed by Kennedy Space 
Center-all packaged in a single unit. Once the fully functional transceiver has been 
tested and performance verified, flights of opportunity will be identified for in-flight 
evaluation. 
Other Related Efforts 
Two other LCT2 related efforts are also planned for 2007. First, the high power S-band 
amplifier will be redesigned with a Gallium Nitride transistor amplifier, that will be nearly 
twice as efficient as the present design. Second, work is beginning on design of a Ku 
upconverter module that will drop into the present amplifier well. The result will be a low 
radio frequency power « 20 dBm) Ku modulator that can drive a higher power external 
solid state amplifier or traveling wave tube. Quadrature phase shift keying data rates 
greater than 150 megabits per second will be achievable using the direct radio frequency 
quadrature modulator that is in use on the present design. 
The LCT2 development team has been managed by NASA and consists of both civil 
servant and contractor members. The primary engineering contract support has been 
provided by LJT & Associates from Columbia, Maryland. Initial mechanical and thermal 
analysis was supported by the Instrumentation Development Group at Johns Hopkins 
University. Presently, the Mid-Atlantic Institute for Space Technology-a consortium 
made up of area government, industry, and academic entities-is providing engineering 
and program support. 
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Space-Based Range Command and Telemetry Processor 
Kennedy Space Center has developed a partnership with Wallops Flight Facility and is 
working closely with Wallops on a current project to develop a light weight, low power 
range safety unit for use in space-based applications. The range safety unit will show 
that with today's technologies, it is possible to meet both the range safety requirements 
and the space application requirements of size, weight, and power. The range safety unit 
will have the following capabilities: 
• Receive and process forward link commands 
• Receive and process GPS data 
• Send return link data via a satellite relay that meets the required link margin for 
range safety 
It is anticipated that the first test flight of the range safety unit will be on a sounding 
rocket. 
The range safety unit is based on an integrated architecture and consists of four circuit 
boards using the latest technologies. The first board is the modulator board being 
developed by Wallops Flight Facility. This board provides the radio front-end functions. 
The second board is the command and telemetry processor being developed by 
Kennedy Space Center's Advanced Development System Division. This board provides 
the processing functions. 
The commercially available GPS receiver is the third board and the fourth board is the 
power management board also being developed by Wallops Flight Facility. The power 
management board converts the standard 28 voltage input to the appropriate voltages. 
The boards are contained in an enclosure that is less than 125 cubic inches and weighs 
less than six pounds. 
Command and Telemetry Processor Design 
The command and telemetry processor design is based on a field programmable gate 
array with an embedded processor core. The field programmable gate array provides the 
flexibility that allows the command and telemetry processor to be programmed for 
different functions and the processor is used to execute code. The command and 
telemetry processor receives forward link commands via the modulator board interface 
and processes the commands in the field programmable gate array. Similarly, the 
command and telemetry processor receives GPS data via the GPS board interface and 
processes the data in the field programmable gate array. 
For the return link, the command and telemetry processor formats and sends return link 
data to the modulator board that includes range safety unit status data, command status 
data, and GPS data. One Ethernet and several serial interfaces are available on the 
command and telemetry processor for control and data exchange. The field 
programmable gate array is programmed through a standard Joint Test Action Group 
(JTAG) interface available on the command and telemetry processor. 
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Command and Telemetry Processor Development 
The command and telemetry processor is currently in the development phase where the 
design and implementation of the circuit board has been completed as shown below. 
The design and programming of the field programmable gate array is partially complete 
where the serial interface, Ethernet interface, GPS interface, configuration EPROM 
functions and boot flash functions have been implemented. Once the command and 
telemetry processor and GPS boards have been tested together, the rest of the boards 
will be integrated and a functional test will be performed on the range safety unit. 
Top Side of Board Bottom Side of Board 
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Special Interest Items 
Distant Focusing Overpressure 
Distant focusing is defined as an atmospheric phenomenon that can produce greatly 
enhanced overpressure due to sonic velocity gradients with respect to altitude. These 
enhanced overpressures can break windows in distant communities, which may result in 
personal injury. Distant focusing overpressure, sometimes referred to as far field blast 
overpressure, is of concern in the event of a large explosion on or around the launch pad 
and occurs only under certain meteorological conditions. 
A variety of launch accident scenarios may lead to an on- or near-pad explosion. 
Examples include an intact vehicle impact with the ground or tower, a partial vehicle 
break-up that produces ground impacts of liquid propellant tanks or solid rocket motor 
segments, or vehicle tip-over at the pad due to one or more of the solid rocket motors 
not firing properly. Mitigation from these near field overpressure hazards includes 
establishing a quantity-distance criteria or evacuating personnel from areas of high risk. 
Data from near field overpressure plus atmospheric data is used to determine distant 
focusing overpressure. 
Near field overpressure waves travel 
supersonically through the 
atmosphere and are not significantly 
affected by differing meteorological 
conditions as they expand radially 
from the explosion's source (picture at 
right). As the wave energy dissipates 
to levels less than a few pounds per 
square inch, the wave's propagation 
pattern changes to more closely 
resemble a standard acoustic wave. 
Therefore, the prediction of blast wave 
effects at intermediate to long 
distances can be based on the same 
basic principles that describe the 
propagation of acoustic waves, 
namely Snell's law. 
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Determining the Potential for Focusing 
To determine the potential for focusing, atmospheric conditions must be monitored and 
evaluated. Two atmospheric parameters are paramount in determining acoustic wave 
propagation: wind speed gradients and temperature gradients. Relative humidity and 
pressure are also involved to a lesser extent. From these parameters, a sonic velocity 
profile (with altitude) is determined for each azimuth around the launch pad to determine 
if conditions are favorable for overpressure focusing. Sonic velocity is the calculated 
speed of sound plus a directional wind speed component. In basic terms, as the sonic 
velocity decreases with altitude, wave fronts are refracted upward or away from the 
ground. As the sonic velocity increases with altitude, wave fronts are refracted 
downward or toward the ground. 
Understanding the attenuation conditions and their effect on overpressure strengths at 
population receptors, the risk of breaking windows and causing serious injuries can be 
calculated. Because distant focusing overpressure is not a hazard that can normally be 
contained within the base boundaries, a risk-based approach for evaluation has been 
accepted by the range community. Flight safety analysis is used to establish launch 
commit criteria, usually expressed in terms of casualty expectation (Ec), that protect 
people from any hazard associated with far field blast window breakage effects due to 
potential explosions during launch vehicle flight. 
BLASTDFO Computer Model 
A physics-based computer model, commonly referred to as BLASTDFO, is used to 
assess the risk associated with far field blast overpressure. The model was developed 
by ACTA Inc. and includes modules and databases to calculate and assess potential 
explosive yields, acoustic ray traces, receptor overpressures, glass breakage, base and 
community population and window information, human vulnerability, and individual and 
collective casualty expectation. 
Just before launch, the distant focus overpressure flight analyst evaluates current 
weather conditions and identifies any areas that may be subject to enhanced or focused 
BlvtDFO Raypath Map overpressure. Ray tracing plots, like the 
- D'"'- one shown to the left, are analyzed to 
determine if enhanced or focusing 
conditions are present. These regions 
represent the areas where glass breakage 
is most likely to occur. Average 
overpressures, window breakage, and 
casualty expectations are then calculated. 
If either the individual or collective 
casualty risk exceeds launch commit 
criteria and cannot be mitigated to 
acceptable levels, the analyst will recommend a launch hold. 
Two products of BLASTDFO are shown below. On the left is an example of isopleths of 
probability of focus. On the right is an example of peak overpressure. Distant focus 
overpressure hazards occur almost instantaneously with the anomaly, so these 
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products are forwarded to emergency planning managers to aid in any required 
emergency response preparation. 
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Fortunately. on-base distant focus overpressure risk is fairly easy to mitigate. When 
facilities at higher risk are identified. personnel are requested to move away from 
windows or simply go outside (away from windows) to watch the launch. Not a bad 
compromise! 
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Space Florida 
The nation is seeing the birth and early growth of a new space tourism industry and 
NASA's Vision for Space Exploration has initiated the Constellation and Commercial 
Orbital Transportation Services programs. These events bring new opportunities and 
challenges to Florida's space community. 
To address these opportunities, a commission was formed to study and make 
recommendations concerning Florida's role in the future of commercial launches. The 
Governor's Commission on the Future of Space and Aeronautics in Florida final report 
highlighted two customer service areas that are critical to helping make the Eastern 
Range more "user friendly." The areas are: 
• Customer Service Process, including the Universal Documentation process 
• Flight Safety Approval Process 
Another result of the Commission's report was a restructuring of Florida's space-related 
organizations into one organization called Space Florida (http://www.spaceflorida.gov). 
To correct the customer service concerns cited above, a contract was signed in August 
2006 between Florida Space Authority (now Space Florida) and a contractor team to 
provide consulting services and flight safety approval assistance to new commercial 
launch customers. One of the program elements is to establish a training program to 
help new customers understand the Eastern Range flight safety approval process, the 
Universal Documentation System, and range requirements. 
Training Program 
NASA's Kennedy Space Center, the 45th Space Wing Range Safety Office, and the 
Federal Administration Association, Office of the Associate Administrator for Space 
Transportation are developing training programs to increase the effectiveness of their 
employees and to aid their government customers in navigating through range safety 
requirements. 
In coordination with the Air Force, Kennedy Space Center, and the Federal Aviation 
Administration, the Space Florida contractors will develop a range safety training 
program tailored specifically for commercial launch customers. Design documents are 
already complete and new courses should be available in early 2007. 
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The contractors are currently providing 
valuable consulting services to new and 
potential Space Florida customers, 
including the Commercial Orbital 
Transportation Services contractors 
whose logos are shown to the right. 
Flight Safety System 
Another exciting element of the Space 
Florida program is the development of 
alternate, or pre-approved, flight safety 
systems. The contractor will identify 
available flight safety system components 
and investigate future flight safety system 
options and concepts for government 
furnished or government approved flight 
safety systems. 
The contractor will develop several 
alternative 
concepts for a feasible system, dubbed universal flight safety system, along with 
minimum performance requirements. Options will include such concepts as government 
furnished, government approved, one size fits all, launch vehicle class unique systems, 
and entire integrated systems versus SUbsystem/component concepts. The contractor 
will coordinate preliminary concepts with Space Florida, the 45th Space Wing Range 
Safety Office, and NASA and, as a team, select final concepts to pursue. 
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NASA Expendable Launch Vehicle Payload Safety Program 
NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance established a NASA team 
to update the expendable launch vehicle payload safety review process and replace the 
current NASA-STD-8719.8, Expendable Launch Vehicle Payload Safety Review Process 
Standard, with a NASA procedural requirements document. The team's goal is to 
develop a program with improved structure and processes for ensuring NASA 
expendable launch vehicle payloads are consistently designed, transported, processed, 
tested, integrated with the launch vehicle, and launched safely. The new process will be 
coordinated and implemented jointly with the Air Force approval process (for launches 
from Air Force ranges) and will retain the Payload Safety Working Group and a phased 
safety review approach. 
Chapters One and Two of the new Expendable Launch Vehicle Payload Safety Program 
NPR, are complete and in the review cycle. Chapter One documents the agency policy for 
Expendable Launch Vehicle Payload Safety and Chapter Two describes the Safety 
Review and Approval Process. Technical design and operational requirements for the 
payload and ground support equipment are presently being developed combining NASA 
and Air Force requirements (AFSPCMAN 91-710, Range Safety User Requirements 
Manual). 
An Expendable Launch Vehicle Payload Safety and Mission Success Conference was 
held February 6 - 8,2007. For more information, you can access information about the 
conference website at insert link to website for conference 
Before the conference began, an informational exchange session was held on February 
5 to address Expendable Launch Vehicle Payload Safety Program development, 
requirements, and implementation. An overview of the Program's policies, processes, 
and requirements will be presented and discussed. In addition, training courses are 
being developed for working group members and engineers as well as program 
mangers. 
[Insert photo of Calypso payload here.] 
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Subminiature Flight Safety System 
A new technology currently under development is the subminiature flight safety system 
shown in the picture below. Concept development for this system began in May 2004 
and was completed in September 2005. During this stage, requirements were 
developed, technology capabilities were derived, and approximate developmental costs 
were researched. A systems engineering analysis was also performed on the 
subminiature flight safety system during this time to improve and solidify feasible options 
and capabilities of the system. 
Representative Discrete Components 
6 Ibs -102 In3 
System Status 
SFSS 
1.25 Ibe -10 in3 
Phase I began in September 2005 after concept development was complete. This phase 
focused on developing and submitting Central Test and Evaluation Investment Program 
documentation to Tri-Service Representatives. All documentation and reports have been 
submitted for Phase I and, as of this publication, the subminiature flight safety system 
program is awaiting approval from Central Test and Evaluation for Phase II funding . 
Phase II will include development of the system specifications and then a contract 
awarding process to build, test, and implement the subminiature flight safety system. 
This phase will also include qualification testing for components and eventual flight tests 
and demonstrations and most likely will reach completion in late 2009 or early 2010. 
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Subminiature Flight Termination System Features 
Some of the features and possible capabilities of the subminiature flight safety system 
are listed below and shown in the following diagram: 
• Flexible, wide-range missile capabilities, such as air-to-air, surface-to-air, surface-to-
surface, and air-to-ground 
• Ability to operate without radar tracking infrastructure 
• Low cost, less than $35,000 
• Telemetry capability for system health status (encrypted) 
• Time and space information to provide accurate weapon system position (encrypted) 
• Dual, redundant flight termination receivers/controllers 
• Approximately 10 to 14 in3 in size 
• Encoder and encryption capability 
• Dual safe and arm controllers/inhibitors 
The system also meets all Ree 319, Flight Termination Systems Commonality Standard 
requirements 
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Subminiature Flight Termination System Architecture 
The subminiature flight termination system is being designed in a modular format to 
make several different options available. This format will make the unit more flexible to 
the needs of the user or program. For example, if the program does not wish to encode 
the telemetry downlink, then that module can be eliminated from the system without 
causing any disturbance with other systems or modules. System architecture for the 
subminiature flight termination system includes a variety of components and modules 
shown in the graphic below. 
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The enhanced flight termination system could be used in conjunction with the 
subminiature flight termination system. The enhanced flight termination system ground 
equipment (encoders, monitors, triple data encryption units) encrypts messages and 
sends them to the command transmitter system, consisting of Legacy modulators, 
exciters, and high power amplifiers. The command transmitter system relays the 
enhanced flight termination system messages to the vehicle via the command 
transmitter. Ultra high frequency antennas pick up the transmitted enhanced flight 
termination system signals and send them to the flight termination receiver. 
Hi ghvoitfj~ie pljlsect'! 
: & Low voltage : 
I latched outputs I 
From there, the commands are processed and sent to the flight termination controllers 
for action. The controller then sends a signal to the flight termination system safe and 
arm devices to initiate destruct if termination is necessary. The unit also contains a GPS 
sensor/receiver that will provide accurate GPS tracking for range ground stations. The 
telemetry being retrieved from the vehicle will be encrypted within the subminiature flight 
termination system unit for transmission to range ground stations. 
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Even though this system is not yet complete, the technology involved and the 
determination exhibited in making this program succeed are remarkable. Range Safety 
will continue to work with the subminiature flight safety system program to ensure that 
the newest, groundbreaking methods and technologies are available for all ranges and 
users as desired. Range Safety will also continue working with the program to ensure 
that public safety is a top priority in designing this system. 
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Status Reports 
Kennedy Space Center Range Safety Representative 
The Kennedy Space Center Range Safety Representative is tasked with implementing 
NASA policy and keeping the Agency Range Safety Manager informed of all activities 
related to range safety. Over the course of the past year, the Range Safety 
Representative supported a myriad of range safety activities, ranging from pre-launch 
policy interpretation and guidance to providing on-console support during launch 
campaigns. 
Constellation Program 
For the Constellation Program, the Kennedy Space Center Range Safety Representative 
was involved in providing a top-level tailored version of NPR 8715.5 for use in driving 
architectural as well as system level requirements. In addition, a number of Constellation 
documents such as those listed below were reviewed : 
• Constellation Architecture Requirements Document 
• System Requirements Document 
• Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance Plan 
The resulting support will capture applicable Range Safety requirements for the program 
to implement. 
The Range Safety Representative represented the Agency on the Crew Exploration 
Vehicle Smart Buyer team. This effort involved providing the Constellation Program with 
an in-house design using subject matter experts across the Agency to assist the 
program in the conduct of proposal evaluations. The Range Safety Representative also 
provided continued support to the Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel. 
Space Shuttle Program 
For the Space Shuttle program, the Range Safety Representative was involved in the 
development and publication of a Kennedy Space Center Launch and Landing Range 
Safety Risk Management Plan as well as a Landing Implementation Plan. These plans 
detail how Kennedy Space Center and the Space Shuttle program intend to meet the 
individual and collective risk criteria found in NPR 8715.5. Launch and entry risks 
estimates were evaluated for STS-121 and STS-115 and both sets of results were well 
within NPR criteria . 
The Range Safety Representative also provided continued support to the Shuttle Range 
Safety Panel and supported STS-115, STS-121 and STS-116 launches on console in 
the Range Operations Control Center. 
Launch Services Program 
For the launch services program, the Range Safety Representative supported a number 
of NASA expendable launch vehicle campaigns, including Calypso CloudSat and Pluto 
New Horizons. This effort involved attending all the NASA and Air Force Safety 
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readiness reviews and ensuring NPR requirements were being met during the respective 
launch countdowns. 
Agency Activities 
For Agency activities, the Range Safety Representative served as NASA point of contact 
to the Range Safety Group and supported several committees charged with developing 
or rewriting nationwide standards on a number of important range safety issues. These 
topics included developing reusable launch vehicle and uninhabited aerial vehicle 
requirements and a rewrite of RCC 321 , Common Risk Criteria for National Test Ranges 
for risk evaluation and approval. 
The Range Safety Representative also led an Agency-wide team through initial planning 
of a NASA common flight analysis tool development activity. This activity takes a 
strategic approach by leveraging the talents of individuals and tools within and outside 
the Agency. It is expected that this effort will result in the ability to share resources in a 
way that creates greater technical in-house capability across the Agency. 
Other Range Safety Activities 
Other Range Safety activities that the Range Safety Officer was involved in included the 
following : 
• Documenting approval of range safety non-conformances/variances for all applicable 
NASA launches 
• Publishing Range Safety Variance and Spaceflight Risk Assessment Board 
processes for Kennedy Space Center, processes describing the steps taken should 
risk estimates be higher than acceptable per NPR criteria 
• Supporting discussions regarding flight termination system frequency migration plans 
and how they affect future NASA missions 
• Supporting discussions relative to meeting secure systems requirements found in 
NPR 2810, Security of Information Technology 
• Assisting the Agency Range Safety Manager in developing a Range Safety 
Operations course for NASA, the last in a series of NASA Safety Training Center 
taught courses 
• Tracking and coordinating audit responses and corrective actions generated from the 
Wallops Flight Facility and Dryden Flight Research Center Range Safety 
Assessments conducted in 2005 
• Providing Toxic and Distant Focus Overpressure risk analysis support to Wallops 
Flight Facility for the TAC SAT-2 Minotaur launch 
The past year was a challenge in supporting a number of launch and entry campaigns, 
providing critical early support to the Constellation Program, and continuing to ensure 
Kennedy Space Center safely implements NASA Range Safety requirements. The 
coming year promises to be at least as busy and the Kennedy Space Center Range 
Safety Representative will continue to provide critical support whenever called upon by 
NASA programs or to address issues that may arise. 
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Wallops Flight Facility 
Wallops Flight Facility has had yet another successful year. The Sounding Rockets 
Program supported 20 missions including the first flight test of the autonomous flight 
safety system. The Balloon Program Office supported 13 successful missions while 
uninhabited aerial vehicle operations grew significantly. The TacSat missions 
demonstrated the Facility's ability to provide responsive range services. New range 
technologies continue to be developed and the Wallops Mission Planning Laboratory 
was brought on line this year. 
Sounding Rockets Program 
The Sounding Rockets Program had a successful year, supporting 20 missions from 
Wallops, White Sands Missile Range, and Hawaii. These missions supported NASA 
Space Science, technology development, and educational outreach experiments, and a 
variety of Department of Defense projects. The Program experienced a 100 percent 
mission success rate for the period. The Wallops Safety Office provided operational 
support and analysis for all these missions. 
Autonomous Flight Safety System. Wallops conducted the first flight test of the 
autonomous flight safety system this year on a sounding rocket mission from White 
Sands Missile Range. The autonomous flight safety system is an on-board sensor and 
computer suite designed to assess a launch vehicle's performance against pre-
programmed range safety mission rules. When rules are violated, the system sends 
commands to the vehicle's flight safety system to terminate flight. The White Sands 
Missile Range flight successfully demonstrated the autonomous flight safety system's 
ability to correctly determine appropriate on-board decision making. The autonomous 
flight safety system and Low-Cost TDRSS Transceiver have been packaged and are 
scheduled to fly as experiments in an upcoming SpaceX Falcon 1 flight from Kwajalein 
Atoll. 
Other New Technologies. Additionally, the Sounding Rocket Program has been 
demonstrating other new technologies, including a computer-guided hazard avoidance 
landing system for use on planetary missions, a new fine pointing celestial attitude 
control system, and a new velocity vector tracking attitude control system for use on 
suborbital sciences missions. Many of these efforts are collaborative with partners at the 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Langley Research Center, and Kennedy Space Center. The 
Wallops Safety Office has played a key role in ensuring successful implementation of 
these missions. 
Balloon Program Office 
The Balloon Program Office at Wallops Flight Facility conducted 13 missions during 
2006. Flight operations were conducted from Fort Sumner, New Mexico; Palestine, 
Texas; Kiruna, Sweden, and McMurdo, Antarctica. The Wallops Safety Office supported 
the 2006 balloon flight program by providing flight safety analysis reports for operational 
implementation for both continental United States and foreign operations. Flights were 
conducted in support of Space and Earth science payloads as well as developmental 
test flights for new balloon design and balloon film qualification. Flight durations ranged 
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from 6 hours to 28 days with the longest flight occurring over Antarctica. The northern 
hemisphere flight capability was used from Sweden-to-Canada for the second year, with 
science payload recovery in northern Canada. 
The Balloon Program Office 
continued the ultra long 
duration balloon development 
with the test flight of a 6 
million cubic foot test article 
from Kiruna, Sweden in May 
2006. (See the picture at the 
right.) 
While the flight did not result 
in a satisfactory inflation of 
the balloon, considerable data 
were collected for use in 
engineering models that will 
be used to develop necessary 
design changes. 
Further flight testing of the 
ultra long duration balloon is 
planned for 2007. The ultra 
long duration balloon is being 
developed to provide 
extended duration flight, 
upwards of 60-100 days, at 
constant float altitudes. 
Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle 
Uninhabited aerial vehicle 
operations grew Significantly 
during 2006. Wallops Flight 
Facility continued a heavy 
workload with the AAI 
Aerosonde in support of 
NASA science missions, 
including a deployment to Key 
West, Florida to collect data 
on early formation of 
hurricanes. 
Additionally, Langley Research Center began frequent operations on the Wallops Island 
uninhabited aerial vehicle runway with its Global Transport Model operations. 
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New Range Technologies 
Wallops technologists continued development and testing of numerous new range 
technologies that promise to improve the responsiveness and cost of launch operations. 
The Low-Cost TDRSS Transceiver development progressed with a successful 
operational flight of a 20 watt transmitter-only unit on the Air Force Minotaur I COSMIC 
mission in January 2006. The Low-Cost TDRSS Transceiver enables the relay of flight 
data to the ground without requiring line-of-sight, through use of NASA's TDRSS 
satellites at a small fraction of the cost of existing systems. Progress continues on 
developing a 40 watt transmitter as well as with the development of the receiver 
subsystem. 
Prototype hardware has also been developed for a new low-cost flight S-8and telemetry 
phased array antenna and beamformer. Once operational, this system promises 
significantly increased data rates. Testing of the initial unit is underway, and a flight test 
is anticipated for mid-2007. Planning is also underway for Ka and Ku-Band systems as 
well. 
TacSat 
On 16 December 2006, a Minotaur I 
rocket carrying the Air Force 
Research Laboratory's TacSat-2 
satellite and NASA's GeneSat-1 
microsatellite was successfully 
launched from Wallops Flight 
Facility. (See picture at right.) The 
TacSat-2 mission demonstrated 
Wallops' ability to provide responsive 
range service, by providing 
spacecraft and launch vehicle 
integration and launch operations 
within six months of the Air Force's 
request. 
Two Minotaur 1 rockets are 
scheduled for launch in 2007 from 
Wallops carrying the near-field 
infrared experiment satellite in April 
and the TacSat-3 satellite in 
October. In anticipation of these 
missions, range and range safety 
personnel spent much of 2006 
modernizing facilities, performing 
pre-mission analyses, and testing. 
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Demonstration Missions 
Wallops personnel are also preparing for the demonstration mission of a new 
commercial high-performance suborbital rocket, ALV-X1 built by Alliant Techsystems. A 
launch site pathfinder test of the ALV-X1 verified that vehicle processing procedures and 
equipment were ready for live motors and flight hardware. The demonstration mission, 
scheduled for mid 2007, will carry two NASA hypersonics experiments sponsored by 
NASA's Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate. The first, HyBoLT, is a boundary 
layer transition experiment developed by Langley Research Center. The second, 
SOAREX, is an aerodynamic re-entry experiment developed by Ames Research Center. 
The mission has been designated HSA (HyBoLT, SOAREX, ALV-X1). 
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Wallops Mission Planning Laboratory 
The Wallops Mission Planning Laboratory was brought on line this year. The 
Mission Planning Laboratory serves as a high fidelity range mission simulator 
that can be used to assess trajectories, instrumentation coverage, hazard areas, 
and other critical parameters in the preparation of upcoming missions. Ultimately, 
the Mission Planning Laboratory will work with launch vehicle hardware systems 
as a test bed for new technologies. 
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Dryden Flight Research Center 
The Dryden Flight Research Center, located at Edwards Air Force Base, California, is 
NASA's primary installation for flight research. Over the past 60 years, projects at 
Dryden have led to major advancements in the design and capabilities of many civilian 
and military aircraft. The Center is involved in the following: 
• Support of operations for the Space Shuttle 
• Development of future access-to-space vehicles 
• Conduct of airborne science missions and flight operations 
• Development of piloted and uninhabited aircraft test beds for research and science 
missions 
Range Safety operations at Dryden are managed by the Range Safety Office. Under an 
alliance agreement with the Air Force Flight Test Center, Edwards Air Force Base, the 
Dryden Center Director established the Range Safety Office to provide independent 
review and oversight of range safety issues. 
The Range Safety Office also supports the Center by providing trained flight termination 
system engineers, range safety risk analysts, and range safety officers to provide 
mission and project support. In addition, the office supports the NASA Range Safety 
Training Program by providing the uninhabited aerial vehicle perspective in the 
development of range safety courses. 
Dryden continues to support the testing of a wide range of uninhabited aerial vehicles 
and is involved in various other projects that are described below. 
Altair 
General Atomics Aeronautical Systems' Altair uninhabited aerial vehicle successfully 
completed several 20 plus hour flights with NASA Ames Research Center and National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration scientific payloads in October. The purpose of 
the flights was to demonstrate the feasibility of a high altitude, long endurance 
uninhabited aerial vehicle to provide real-time data for the detection and surveillance of 
wildfires in the Western United States. 
Model-Type Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles 
The Autonomous Soaring Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle Project used RnR Products' Cloud 
Swift sailplane to demonstrate that using thermal lift could significantly extend the range 
and endurance of model uninhabited aerial vehicles without a corresponding increase in 
fuel requirements. 
Blended Wing Body Low Speed Vehicle 
The blended wing body low speed uninhabited aerial vehicle is a dynamically scaled 
version of the original concept vehicle. The primary goals of this test and research 
project are as follows: 
• Study the flight and handling characteristics of the blended wing body design 
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• Match the vehicle's performance with engineering predictions based on computer 
and wind tunnel studies 
• Develop and evaluate digital flight control algorithms 
• Assess the integration of the propulsion system to the airframe 
Industry studies suggest that because of its efficient configuration, the blended wing 
body would consume 20 percent less fuel than jetliners of today while cruising at high 
subsonic speeds on flights of up to 7,000 nautical miles. 
Ikhana 
NASA's Ikhana uninhabited aerial vehicle is a General Atomics Predator-B modified to 
support Earth science missions for the Science Mission Directorate. The aircraft is 
capable of mission durations in excess of 24 hours at altitudes above 40,000 feet. The 
aircraft is designed to be disassembled and transported in a large shipping container 
aboard standard military transports. On-board support systems include a NASA 
developed airborne research test system, a system that can host research flight control 
algorithms that test autonomous sensor or autonomous aircraft control concepts. 
Orion 
The Orion Project is part of the Agency's Constellation Program. The Orion Project 
consists of the crew module and launch abort system. Dryden is tasked with conducting 
a series of flight tests to demonstrate proper operations of the launch abort system and 
the crew module recovery systems in response to abort events initiated on the launch 
pad and during the initial ascent phase of flight. The abort flight tests will be conducted 
at the United States Army White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. 
As can be seen in the description of these projects, Dryden Flight Research Center 
plays a vital role in advancing technology and science through flight. At Dryden, 
America's leadership in aeronautics and space technology is demonstrated as the 
Center continues to push the envelope to revolutionize aviation and pioneer aerospace 
technology. 
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NASA Headquarters 
The Office of Safety and Mission Assurance at NASA Headquarters works to ensure the 
safety and success of all NASA activities by developing and overseeing the 
implementation of Agency-level policies and requirements related to safety, reliability, 
maintainability, and quality assurance. The NASA Range Safety Program functions as 
an element of the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance. The Office also approves and 
promulgates Agency-level range safety policies and requirements, designates the NASA 
Range Safety Manager, and funds and oversees Range Safety Program activities. 
The Headquarters Range Safety Representative is part of the Safety and Assurance 
Requirements Division of the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance. 
MISSION SUPPORT DIVISION 
I 
OFFICE OF SAFETY 
AND 
MISSION ASSURANCE 
SAFETY MW ASSURANCE 
REQUIREMENTS DIVISION 
HEADQUARTERS 
RANGE SAFETY 
REPRESENTATIVE 
REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT 
DIVISION 
The Headquarters Range Safety Representative and other members of the Office 
worked regularly with Agency range safety personnel and participated in a number of 
range safety related projects and initiatives throughout 2006. Articles addressing a 
number of the topics discussed below can be found in this NASA Range Safety Annual 
Report. 
Expendable Launch Vehicle Payload Safety 
The Office of Safety and Mission Assurance has established a team of personnel with 
expendable launch vehicle payload safety expertise from throughout the Agency in an 
effort to develop a new NASA Expendable Launch Vehicle Payload Safety Program. A 
major accomplishment for this team in 2006 was the finalization of new NASA payload 
safety policy which was published in Chapter 3 of NPR 8715.3, General Safety Program 
Requirements, dated September 2006. This document includes Agency safety policy 
applicable to all types of payloads. It establishes the NASA Expendable Launch Vehicle 
Payload Safety Program and it assigns associated roles and responsibilities. The team 
also made progress in developing a revised safety review and approval process 
applicable to all NASA expendable launch vehicle payload projects and associated 
technical requirements. 
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Range Commanders Council 
The Headquarters Range Safety Representative actively participated in semiannual 
Range Commanders Council Range Safety Group meetings in 2006 and regularly 
worked as a member of the Range Safety Group Risk Committee to develop new Range 
Commanders Council Range Safety Risk Standards, scheduled to be published in 2007. 
Space Shuttle and Constellation Range Safety Panels 
Office of Safety and Mission Assurance representatives participated in the activities of 
the Space Shuttle Range Safety Panel and the new Constellation Range Safety Panel. 
Training Development 
The Headquarters Range Safety Representative worked with Agency range safety 
personnel in the development of the new NASA Range Safety Systems Training Course, 
which was completed and first offered in 2006. 
Audits and Assessments 
The Office of Safety and Mission Assurance conducted a programmatic audit of NASA's 
Orbital Sciences Corporation launch services contract for the Pegasus and Taurus 
launch vehicles. This audit took place over a 4-week period during April and May of 2006 
and included site visits to Orbital Sciences facilities in Virginia, Arizona, and California. 
The audit included an assessment of Orbital Sciences' implementation of range safety 
requirements and a review of the flow down of NASA safety policies and requirements 
into the associated contracts and operational documents. 
Office of Safety and Mission Assurance representatives participated in a special review 
of the Ultra-Long Duration Balloon Project, which is run out of the Goddard Space Flight 
Center - Wallops Flight Facility. The special review included an assessment of the 
Project's efforts to satisfy NASA range safety policy and requirements for the testing and 
operation of this new type of high-altitude balloon. 
Research and Technology Development 
The Office of Safety and Mission Assurance funds and oversees safety related research 
and technology development projects throughout the Agency. Range safety projects for 
2006 included the Global Positioning System Operational Information Laboratory at 
Wallops Flight Facility, the Joint Advanced Range Safety System Project at Dryden 
Flight Research Center, and the Autonomous Flight Safety System Project at Kennedy 
Space Center and Wallops Flight Facility. 
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Johnson Space Center 
Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel 
+ 
CONSTELLATION 
Late in 2005, it became increasingly clear that there were many 
questions and issues related to range safety that needed to be 
coordinated across the multiple Constellation Program Projects and 
organizations. It was time to start addressing some of the early 
design and requirements issues and open a coordinated dialog with 
the 45th Space Wing on NASA's new vision and objectives. 
In February 2006, the Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel was officially chartered 
by the Constellation Program and jointly signed by the 45th Space Wing Commander and 
the program manager. 
Highlights of the Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel Charter 
Highlights of the Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel charter are included below. 
I. PURPOSE: This directive establishes the manner in which launch range safety 
matters will be managed for Constellation program vehicles, including specifying key 
interfaces with the Department of Defense for launch range safety (primarily the Air 
Force 45th Space Wing responsible for the Eastem Range). 
II. SCOPE: All Range Safety activities for elements of Constellation launch vehicle flights 
and pre-operational test flights are within the scope of this directive. The Launch 
Constellation Range Safety Panel will: 
• Serve as the technical forum to facilitate formulation and joint approval of NASA/Air 
Force Range Safety policy agreements 
• Identify Range Safety requirements and propose tailoring, as required 
• Support risk model and analysis tool development (formulation, assumptions, and 
input data) 
• Integrate Range Safety related hardware and software changes 
• Monitor Range Safety System design, testing, and implementation 
• Initiate and integrate operational Range Safety activities such as operational 
concepts and procedures, analysis of trajectory design variations, mission planning , 
flight rules and launch commit criteria development 
Note: Entry vehicle range safety is addressed in another directive. 
V. ORGANIZATION: The Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel is comprised of 
NASA and Air Force representatives and is the forum for range safety coordination and 
negotiations between the agencies. The Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel is co-
chaired by the 45th Space Wing Range Safety Manager and the NASA Constellation 
Range Safety Manager. In addition to the chairperson, NASA membership on this panel 
includes representatives from the following: 
• Launch Vehicle Project 
• Crew Exploration Vehicle Project 
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• Kennedy Space Center Constellation Ground Operations Project and Range Safety 
Representative 
• Johnson Space Center Flight Design and Dynamics, Flight Director Office, Astronaut 
Office, Constellation Operations Integration, and Constellation Systems Engineering 
and Integration 
• Headquarters Constellation Integration and Analysis and Safety, Reliability, and 
Quality Assurance 
In addition to the 45th Space Wing Range Safety Manager, Eastern Range membership 
on this panel includes representatives from the following 45th Space Wing organizations: 
• Range Operations Squadron 
• Launch Analysis 
• Launch Safety and Analysis 
The Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel has strong representation from all of the 
key program elements and has been very active since its inception. By the end of 2006, 
the panel had met 15 times, plus supported multiple splinter meetings, and one face-to-
face in Florida. 
Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel Trajectory Working Group 
The first sub-group from the Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel was the 
Trajectory Working Group. This group coordinates the range safety trajectory analysis 
requirements and manages the distribution of the tasks and products across the multiple 
centers. We have effectively tapped the trajectory expertise from Marshall Space Flight 
Center, Johnson Space Center, Glenn Research Center, and Langley Research Center. 
The Trajectory Working Group is overseeing which of the complex simulation models will 
be used and managing the multitude of trajectory baseline assumptions. Currently, we 
have a long list of analysis tasks that must be completed to feed into the development of 
the risk estimation models. The team is primarily focused on meeting the requirements 
to support the ARES 1-1 test flight, currently scheduled for 2009. 
ARES 1-1 Support 
The ARES 1-1 test flight is designed 
to re-use many Space Shuttle solid 
rocket booster components while 
demonstrating the Constellation 
Program's progress in stepping into 
the new vision. 
The fl ight test vehicle configuration 
shown to the right will consist of a 
four-segment solid rocket booster 
with a dummy fifth segment, as well 
as a dummy shell for the upper stage 
and crew exploration vehicle. The 
flight will demonstrate only the first 
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stage of flight, resulting in a sub-
orbital trajectory and an Atlantic 
Ocean disposal of all of the 
components. 
Other Topics Considered 
Many non-trajectory topics needed the Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel 's 
attention this past year. The baseline design for the Constellation includes re-using the 
Shuttle flight termination system. However, this configuration poses possible 
complications described below. 
Flight Termination System Frequency. The National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration directed all ranges to shift flight termination system frequency 
from 416.6 megahertz to 421 megahertz region by end of 2006. In September 2006, the 
Administration formally granted the Space Shuttle Program a waiver to continue flight 
termination system support at the current frequency through the end of Shuttle program 
in 2010. 
However, this waiver is applicable to the Space Shuttle only. Near the end of the year, it 
is thought that the Air Force will to be granted a waiver by the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration to continue to use the 416.5 
megahertz frequency through the end of 2010. Once formalized, the ARES 1-1 flight will 
be covered by that waiver and reuse of the Shuttle flight termination system frequency 
will remain the plan. 
Aft Segment Linear.Shaped Charge. As noted above, the ARES 1-1 plan was to totally 
reuse the Shuttle solid rocket booster components and accept the fact that the aft 
segment does not have a linear-shaped charge. For the Space Shuttle, approximately 
90 percent of the launch area risks are driven by the threat of an intact aft segment 
impacting on land and generating a large overpressure hazard. 
Though not fully quantified for ARES 1-1, the majority of the Launch Constellation Range 
Safety Panel membership recommended that we amend the test flight design to include 
the charge extension and strive to achieve significant risk reduction. This topic has been 
addressed at numerous Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel meetings and was 
presented to the Program Manager just before the Christmas holiday. 
Constellation Program Manager, Jeff Hanley, made the following decisions: 
• Recommended to the flight test team that they plan to incorporate 
a requirement for adding flight termination functionality to the aft 
segment of the first stage on Ares 1-1 . 
• Candidate design options should be included in the upcoming 
flight test vehicle preliminary design review; schedules adjusted as 
necessary. 
• The Range Safety Panel will continue with planned malfunction 
turn analyses to be completed by late spring. 
109 
• Design options are preferred that would allow deletion of this 
capability (for the purpose of recovering schedule) in the event 
future analyses indicate a defensible technical case can be made 
for either meeting the NASA procedural requirement for casualty 
expectation (Ec) or waiving it, if the program should chose to 
pursue that. 
It was greatly appreciated that program management was responsive to the questions 
and concerns raised concerning this topic while at the same time considering the 
project's direct critical schedule and cost impacts. 
Overall , this has been a very 
productive and dynamic year for the 
Launch Constellation Range Safety 
Panel. Due to the high level of 
cooperation and professionalism 
exhibited by the panel members, the 
integration of the multiple centers and 
agencies has been successful. This 
next year promises many challenges 
focused on supporting the ARES 1-1 
test flight, as we perform a number of 
analyses, engage in detailed tailoring 
negotiations to satisfy Air Force and 
NASA requirements, and further 
establish the relationship with other 
projects. 
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Space Shuttle Range Safety Panel 
The Space Shuttle Range Safety Panel has been involved in a number of activities over 
the past year. The panel supported three STS launches, launch area risk assessment, 
solid rocket booster aft segment analysis, flight termination system frequency change as 
well as hosting the range safety tool summit. The Columbia Debris Catalog Project and 
Flight Operations Version 1 software impacts to shuttle flight dynamics were also 
addressed. 
Support of Shuttle Launches, Launch on Need, and Entry Level Safety Activities 
Range Safety supported three launches in 2006 in addition to the Launch on Need 
rescue mission planning and entry safety activities. 
STS-121. STS-121 was the first International Space Station mission to fly with a low 
dynamic pressure target. This change in mission profile came after the high dynamic 
pressure Range Safety design was complete and required some data redelivery to the 
45th Space Wing so their displays could be updated for the new disposal areas. Launch 
day support was nominal. 
STS-121 was also the first flight to have the protuberance air load ramps removed from 
the external tank. The Lockheed Martin Manned Space Systems assessment of this 
configuration with the performance enhancements certified external tank entry 
trajectories resulted in a violation of the external tank rupture altitude requirements 
(NSTS-07700 Volume X, Space Shuttle Flight and Ground System Specification.) 
Range Safety developed new external tank entry trajectories based on current 
International Space Station mission profiles and presented the methodology and results 
to the Space Shuttle Program and the Range Safety panel. Lockheed Martin Manned 
Space Systems was able to use the new trajectories to clear the Volume X requirements 
and resolve the issue for STS-121. Subsequent flights that have the protuberance air 
load ramp removed from the external tank can use the new trajectories to clear the 
Volume X requirement. 
ST5-115. STS-115 products were delivered according to standard process. Due to data 
hits on launch day, the real time support team was required to use contingency 
procedures to make a determination of the potential for debris impacts on land. The 
anomaly and the resulting updates to Range Safety real time processes were reviewed 
and approved at the Range Safety panel. 
STS-116. STS-116 products were delivered according to standard process. Another 
launch day issue required Range Safety support to use the newly implemented (post-
STS-115) backup procedures to obtain the required vector for debris land impact 
evaluation. By using this procedure, Range Safety's launch day customers received their 
data within the standard delivery time. 
Launch on Need Rescue Missions. Each Space Shuttle Program mission is now 
paired with a Launch on Need rescue mission. The Range Safety production community 
engineered a generic 51 .6-degree Launch on Need rescue mission delivery package 
consisting of the ascent destruct criteria and the disposal document. The Range Safety 
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team presented the process and received approval from the Range Safety Panel on 8 
August 2006. 
The current Range Safety delivery process was tailored to reduce generation and quality 
assurance time while continuing to meet customer expectations. To ensure the 
applicability of the generic data for each future 51 .6-degree Launch on Need 
International Space Station rescue mission, the Range Safety Team established detailed 
verification criteria . The verification criteria were discussed with the external customers 
and the flight design community. 
The criteria were created to verify the applicability of generic data for each future 51 .6-
degree Launch on Need International Space Station rescue mission. The generic 
delivery package is robust and should cover all 51 .6-degree Launch on Need 
International Space Station rescue missions through the end of the Space Shuttle 
Program. 
Entry Range Safety Activities. The Space Shuttle Program continued support of entry 
range safety activities by providing two products for each of the Shuttle missions of 
2006. First, the Space Shuttle Program generated expectation of casualty estimates for 
all potential landing opportunities for this year's missions before launch and updated 
these estimates daily during the last three flight days for each mission. STS-116 marked 
the first flight where Kennedy Space Center on-site risks were modeled with sheltering 
effects included. 
Second, the Space Shuttle Program improved its coordination with the Federal Aviation 
Administration in its continuing effort to keep the Administration aware of Shuttle landing 
opportunities and potential debris footprints in the case of an incident during entry, so 
that the Federal Aviation Administration may best manage risk to the airborne public 
during such incidents. 
Updated Inputs to Launch Area Risk Assessment 
The updated launch area risk assessment effort is nearly complete. The Panel is 
continuing to work through the remaining open work such as space shuttle main engine 
failure rates and the certification of the Air Force's Monte Carlo Launch Area Risk 
Assessment tool. The Panel is reviewing the risk input table mission, specifically to 
ensure concurrence between the 45th Space Wing and NASA on the inputs and the 
resulting risk results. New launch area risk calculations have shown a decrease in 
launch area risk of two orders of magnitude. Open work includes that mentioned as well 
as NASA concurrence on the verification of the 45th Space Wing Launch Area Toxic Risk 
Assessment "3~'' toxics modeling. 
Solid Rocket Booster Aft Segment Analysis 
Previous studies have shown that the intact solid rocket booster aft segment accounts 
for more than 90 percent of the overall launch area risk. The explosive yield that results 
from the aft segment impacting the ground is estimated using several different 
assumptions. One of these assumptions involves the orientation of the aft segment at 
the time of impact. Another assumption pertains to the amount of propellant that is 
burned post-destruct. The combination of these two assumptions can significantly alter 
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the casualty expectation values that are computed. Improving the accuracy of aft 
segment modeling will enhance the accuracy of the overall risk estimates. 
In the spring of 2006, the 45th Space Wing presented the results of a study that analyzed 
solid rocket booster aft segment post-destruct bum rate and impact orientation to the 
Space Shuttle Range Safety Panel. The results showed that the propellant in the aft 
segment is expected to stop buming once destruct action is taken and the chamber 
pressure is released. Furthermore, the analysis results indicated that the aft segment 
would likely impact the ground with an angle of attack of -700 for most failure cases after 
about 10 seconds mission elapsed time. The Space Shuttle Range Safety Panel is 
currently performing a peer review of the 45th Space Wing analysis results. Once the 
peer review is complete, the panel will propose a strategy for implementing the analysis 
results into future launch area risk assessments. 
Flight Termination System Frequency Change 
In March 2000, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
directed all federal test ranges to move flight termination system operations from the 
406.1 - 420.0 megahertz frequency band to the 420.0 - 450.0 megahertz frequency 
band. Currently, the Shuttle operates on a command frequency of 416.5 megahertz. 
In July 2005, the Shuttle Program Requirements Control Board decided to request a 
waiver of the requirement to move off of the current Shuttle frequency. In early 2006, the 
Space Shuttle Range Safety Panel coordinated the effort to request the waiver, and in 
September 2006, a National Telecommunications and Information Administration letter 
to NASA stated approval of the waiver to allow the Space Shuttle Program to continue 
flight termination system support on the current frequency until the end of the program in 
2010. 
The approval of the waiver was based on the assumption that dev~lopment of a 
replacement launch vehicle will continue, and the new launch vehicle will use a flight 
termination system frequency other than the 406.1-420.0 MHz frequency band. 
NASA Agency Range Safety Tool Summit 
The Space Shuttle Program hosted the first Agency Range Safety Tool Summit in 
September 2006. This meeting was proposed by the Agency Range Safety Manager 
and the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance to minimize duplicate efforts occurring at 
the five NASA Centers that currently perform range safety analyses for ascent and entry. 
In addition to Headquarters' Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, each Center that 
has a range safety tool (Kennedy Space Center, Dryden Flight Research Center, 
Wallops Flight Facility, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and Johnson Space Center) was 
represented. 
The attendees discussed the capabilities of each Center's tool and decided to explore 
using Dryden's joint advanced range safety system as the overall integration tool for the 
Agency. First, Wallops' sounding rocket range safety toolset and the Space Shuttle 
Program's public entry risk assessment toolset will be integrated into the joint advanced 
range safety system as trial cases. If successful, the jOint advanced range safety system 
will become the official overall integration tool for the Agency, ultimately hosting both the 
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Space Shuttle Program's ascent and entry risk assessment toolsets. The Space Shuttle 
Program is considering a handful of minor actions and continues to work with the 
Agency in development of a common toolset. 
Columbia Debris Catalog Project 
The Columbia Debris Catalog Project is a jOint effort between the Federal Aviation 
Administration and NASA, made possible under Memorandum of Agreement No. 
FNA/1 0-02-01, KSC No. KCA 2055. The purpose of the project is to study the recovered 
Columbia debris to facilitate realistic estimates of the risk to the public. To accomplish 
this goal, current debris modeling assumptions must be compared and validated against 
real data events. The Columbia accident allows experts to use a real data event to 
analyze an entry breakup event and facilitate further studies on adjusting current debris 
risk modeling assumptions and techniques. 
Approximately 90,000 debris pieces have been recovered and more are being collected 
on a weekly basis through the Columbia Research & Preservation Office located at 
Kennedy Space Center. Although the debris collected at the time of recovery in 2001 
were cataloged, no piece contained sufficient characteristic data required for further 
debris risk modeling analysis. In 2004, this project was started and through many 
requirements review cycles and budgetary constraints, the USA/Change Partnering 
Agreement was signed on 20 July 20 2006 to begin work on collecting debris data for 
this project. 
With a total project budget of $145,000, work began in August 2006. The project was 
divided into two different phases. Because the proposed data collection process was 
brand new, the team decided a trial run to test the procedures would benefit any Phase 
II effort by increasing efficiencies in time and cost. Phase I included a two-week debris 
processing period with two full-time dedicated personnel. During that period, 167 debris 
pieces were processed. The processing team tested the requirements, acquired and 
tested the hardware, tested the layout of the facility, and tested and improved the 
procedures. The results of Phase I provided the team with sufficient throughput data and 
processing recommendations to make preliminary recommendations for Phase II. 
The Federal Aviation Administration and NASA team will recommend data collection on 
the remaining debris starting with all "boxed" debris that contains approximately 50 
percent of the total recovered. (Crew module debris will not be processed.) Depending 
on the resources available, a four person processing team could potentially catalog 
16,640 pieces per year without unforeseen project interruptions. At this rate, all 
recovered debris could potentially be catalogued in 5.4 years. 
Pilot Tone 
To date Kennedy Space Center has tested the range safety system pilot tone during 
multiple integrated operations for STS-114, 115 and 116. Testing has occurred during 
integrated pad operations but not during S0007, launch count down operations, due to 
the difficulties related to developing launch commit criteria . Currently, the Eastern Range 
has come forward with the position that they will not require pilot tone for the remainder 
of the Shuttle program. Launch Operations is waiting for an official memo from the 
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Eastern Range. Once that has been received, the Panel will pursue canceling 
implementation of pilot tone for shuttle and closing the current program change request. 
Flight Operations Version 1 Software Impacts to Shuttle Flight Dynamics 
Per Program Requirements Document specifications, Wallops Flight Facility's high-
speed C-band tracking data should be transmitted to Johnson Space Center uncorrected 
for refraction. However, during the flight of STS-114, it was discovered that the tracking 
data provided by the Range Operations Control Center Flight Operations Version 1 
(FOV1) software was corrected for refraction. A software fix request was submitted to 
the FOV1, requesting that Wallops high-speed tracking data be provided to Johnson 
Space Center uncorrected for refraction. The implementation of the fix is not expected to 
occur for another 2.5 years according to the latest estimate provided at the 14 November 
2006 Range Safety Panel meeting. Until the implementation is in place, Wallops high-
speed data will continue to be provided to Johnson Space Center corrected for 
refraction, and the Mission Control Center software correction will not be used. 
The FOV1 correction model is based on one modulus of refraction value for the entire 
year that is representative of a summer/fall atmosphere. To quantify the effects of using 
a single modulus of refraction on the high speed tracking data, USA Navigation 
performed an analysis comparing the FOV1 refraction correction to the Mission Control 
Center refraction correction. The results revealed that while the differences were small 
for the summer/fall months (June through November) when the FOV1 modulus of 
refraction closely resembles the Mission Control Center modulus of refraction, they were 
significantly larger-on the order of 1,500 feet in radial position and 15 feet/second in 
radial velocity-for December through May. 
Operationally, the high speed tracking data will still be able to provide a state vector to 
correct gross onboard navigation errors. However, during the winter/spring months, the 
vectors will likely not be of sufficient quality to update the onboard state to correct for 
small planar dispersions that may have built up during powered flight (Flight rule A 4-57 
F). 
Launch Area Toxic Risk Assessment "30" Certification and Implementation 
The 45th Space Wing is in the process of developing a strategy for certifying and 
deploying Launch Area Toxic Risk Assessment "3D," a new combined debris and toxies 
model for Shuttle launch area risk assessment applications. The Space Shuttle Range 
Safety Panel will identify the appropriate personnel to assist with the evaluation and peer 
review of the Launch Area Toxic Risk Assessment "3D" software. The panel will 
coordinate the effort to implement the new model into future launch area risk 
assessments to achieve more accurate public risk estimates. 
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2006 Launches By Agency 
KSC-Sponsored Launches 
Launch Responsible 
Date Vehicle Payload or Mission Location Organization 
7/4/06 STS-121 Shuttle KSC NASA 
9/9/06 STS-115 Shuttle KSC NASA 
12/9/06 STS-116 Shuttle KSC NASA 
Eastern and Western Range Launches 
Date Vehicle Payload or Mission Launch Responsible 
Location Organization 
1/19/06 Atlas Pluto New Horizons CCAFS NASA 
3/22/06 Pegasus ST-5 VAFB NASA 
4/15/06 Minotaur COSMIC VAFB DoD 
4/20/06 Atlas V ASTRA IKR AV-008 CCAFS DoD 
4/28/06 Delta II CALIPSO/CloudSat VAFB NASA 
5/24/06 Delta II GOES-N CCAFS NASA 
6/21/06 Delta II MITEX CCAFS DoD 
6/28/06 Delta IV NRO L-22 VAFB DoD 
7/4/06 STS 121 Shuttle KSC NASA 
9/9/06 STS 115 Shuttle KSC NASA 
9/25/06 Delta II GPS 2R-15 CCAFS DoD 
10/26/06 Delta II STEREO CCAFS NASA 
11/4/06 Delta IV DMSP F17 VAFB DoD 
11/17/06 Delta II GPS CCAFS DoD 
12/9/06 STS 116 Shuttle KSC NASA 
12/14/06 Delta II NRO L-21 VAFB DoD 
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Wallops Flight Facility Missions 
pate Vehicle Location Launch Resul 
~/8/2006 36.193 US Terrier Black Brant White Sands Missile Range, NM Success 
3/25/2006 30.064 DR Orion White Sands Missile Range, NM Success 
3/25/2006 30.065 DR Orion White Sands Missile Range, NM Success 
14/5/2006 41.068 NT Terrier MKl2-Improved Orion White Sands Missile Range, NM Success 
~112/2006 36.203 GS Terrier Black Brant White Sands Missile Range, NM Success 
15/17/2006 ORW-9999/1 Salisbury University SERl WFF Success 
5/22/2006 12.058 GT Terrier M12-Improved Orion ~ite Sands Missile Range, NM Success 
~/2/2006 1.1 MCM Balloon (554N) ~a,Sweden Success 
~/5/2006 41.073 DR Terrier Improved Orion White Sands Missile Range, NM Success 
6/7/2006 41.071 DR Improved Orion PMRF, Kauai, HI Success 
6/8/2006 41.074 DR Terrier Improved Orion PMRF, Kauai, HI Success 
~/8/2006 NRW-4527 Super Loki Dart WFF Success 
~/8/2006 NRW-4498 Improved Orion SubSem WFF Success 
6/8/2006 30.072 NO Orion WFF Success 
6/23/2006 41.072 DR Terrier Improved Orion PMRF, Kauai, HI Success 
7/ 112006 41.056 UO Terrier Orion White Sands Missile Range, NM Success 
17/2/2006 42.002 DP Terrier Lynx PMRF, Kauai, HI Success 
7/3/2006 42.003 DP Terrier Lynx PMRF, Kauai, HI Success 
7/8/2006 1.1 MCM Balloon (556N) Kiruna, Sweden Success 
7/12/2006 0.8 MCM Balloon (1592P) Palestine, TX Success 
7119/2006 NRW-4553 NFB 112 Scale Patriot WFF Success 
17/21/2006 30.066 DR Improved Orion White Sands Missile Range, NM Success 
7/2112006 30.067 DR Improved Orion White Sands Missile Range, NM Success 
8116/2006 DRW-4536 BQM-34 Wallops Island Success 
8/2112006 36.238 DR Terrier Black Brant White Sands Missile Range, NM Success 
8/25/2006 36.237 DR Terrier Black Brant White Sands Missile Range, NM Success 
8/26/2006 0.8 MCM Balloon (557NT) Ft. Sumner, NM Success 
9/4/2006 0.3 MCM Balloon (558N) Ft. Sumner, NM Success 
~118/2006 0.3 MCM Balloon (559N) Ft. Sumner, NM Success 
~/23/2006 NRW-4436 Black Brant XI WFF Success 
~/25/2006 1.1 MCM Balloon (560N) Ft. Sumner, NM Success 
~/30/2006 0.8 MCM Balloon (561NT) Ft. Sumner, NM Success 
10/28/2006 36.233 UE Terrier Black Brant White Sands Missile Range, NM Success 
11/7/2006 36.233 UE Terrier Black Brant White Sands Missile Range, NM Success 
11/2112006 36.224 UH Terrier Black Brant White Sands Missile Range, NM Success 
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Dryden Flight Research Center Missions 
Flight 
Project Duration Mission 
Date Name Mission (Hours) Location Result 
6/28/2006 Autonomous 2 flights 0.5/f1ight Edwards AFB Success 
Soaring UAV 
07/26/2006 Altair Pod Checkout 7.5 Edwards AFB Success 
Flight 
8/1512006 Altair Fire Mission 1.8 Gray Butte Success 
Sensor Checkout Airspace, 
FlIght Palmdale, CA 
8/16/2006 Altair Fire Mission 8.6 Edwards AFB Success 
Sensor Checkout 
Flight 
10/11/2006- Altair Fire Mission 21 Edwards AFB Success 
10/1212006 Sensor Checkout and R-2508 
Flight 
10/19/2006- Altair Fire Mission 23 Edwards AFB Success 
10/20/2006 Science Flight and R-2508 
10/24/2006- Altair Fire Mission 21 .6 Edwards AFB, Success 
10/25/2006 Science Flight R-2508, 
over Yosemite National 
National Park Airspace 
System 
10/28/2006- Altair Science Flight 16.7 Edwards AFB, Success 
10/29/2006 over Esperanza R-2508, 
Fire National 
Airspace 
System 
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SUMMARY 
Throughout 2006, Range Safety was involved in a number of exciting and challenging 
activities and events, from developing, implementing, and supporting Range Safety 
policies and procedures-such as the Space Shuttle Launch and Landing Plans, the 
Range Safety Variance Process, and the Expendable Launch Vehicle Safety Program 
procedures-to evaluating new technologies. Range Safety training development is 
almost complete with the last course scheduled to go on line in mid-2007. Range Safety 
representatives took part in a number of panels and councils, including the newly formed 
Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel, the Range Commanders Council and its 
subgroups, the Space Shuttle Range Safety Panel, and the unmanned aircraft systems 
working group. 
Space based range safety demonstration and certification (formerly STARS) and the 
autonomous flight safety system were successfully tested. The enhanced flight 
termination system will be tested in early 2007 and the joint advanced range safety 
system mission analysis software tool is nearing operational status. New technologies 
being evaluated included a processor for real-time compensation in long range imaging, 
automated range surveillance using radio interferometry, and a space based range 
command and telemetry processor. Next year holds great promise as we continue 
ensuring safety while pursuing our quest beyond the Moon to Mars. 
We hope you have enjoyed our new web-based format. Anyone having questions or 
wishing to have an article included in the 2007 Range Safety Annual Report should 
contact Alan Dumont, the NASA Range Safety Program Manager located at the 
Kennedy Space Center, or Michael Dook at NASA Headquarters. 
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